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Abstract
Improving education quality is an important concern in many countries around the world. Over the last few
decades, many governments have introduced market mechanisms in education with the objectives of
enhancing choice and encouraging competition. In theory, increased competition between educational
establishments should result in the provision of better quality education services to attract students. These
reforms have given rise to fierce debates in political and scientific circles.
In the first chapter I study the mechanisms that underlie student sorting in a mixed public-private system
using a 2008 education reform implemented in Chile aimed at decreasing education inequality. Specifically, I
exploit the shock to schools’ incentives to test for whether schools select students based on socioeconomic
characteristics. I show that low-SES parent’s school choices are restricted by private school cream-skimming
behavior. I estimate a demand model incorporating these admission restrictions to capture parental
preferences for different school characteristics and peer composition. I show that ignoring cream-skimming
leads to underestimating poor parents' preferences for school quality. I find that the decrease in cream-
skimming induced by the reform led to lower public school enrollment and that strong preferences for high-
income peers drove increased enrollment in schools that opted out of the reform. Overall, this led to increased
segregation with higher impacts in markets with greater competition.
In the second chapter I study the consequences of increased competition and geographic differentiation
resulting from the deregulation of the Chilean college market and the increase in government scholarships
and loans. We study the effects of these changes in market characteristics on the efficiency of the higher
education system and the accessibility and quality of colleges. We estimate a sorting model to account for
vertical and horizontal dimensions of differentiation and quantify the quality of public and private colleges.
We find that most of the growth in enrollment comes from elite institutions that expand the size of existing
programs and private universities that almost doubled their enrollment and at the same time doubling on
average the number of programs offered. We calculate substitution patterns for when a program increase its
quality. We find significant substitution between middle tier programs, whereas top tier universities tend to
substitute mainly from other programs in that same range.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS ON THE ECONOMICS OF SCHOOL CHOICE AND EDUCATION
MARKETS
Ana M. Gazmuri
Fernando Ferreira
Olivia S. Mitchell
Improving education quality is an important concern in many countries around the world.
Over the last few decades, many governments have introduced market mechanisms in
education with the objectives of enhancing choice and encouraging competition. In theory,
increased competition between educational establishments should result in the provision
of better quality education services to attract students. These reforms have given rise to
fierce debates in political and scientific circles.
In the first chapter I study the mechanisms that underlie student sorting in a mixed public-
private system using a 2008 education reform implemented in Chile aimed at decreasing
education inequality. Specifically, I exploit the shock to schools incentives to test for
whether schools select students based on socioeconomic characteristics. I show that low-
SES parents school choices are restricted by private school cream-skimming behavior. I
estimate a demand model incorporating these admission restrictions to capture parental
preferences for different school characteristics and peer composition. I show that ignoring
cream-skimming leads to underestimating poor parents’ preferences for school quality. I
find that the decrease in cream-skimming induced by the reform led to lower public school
enrollment and that strong preferences for high-income peers drove increased enrollment
in schools that opted out of the reform. Overall, this led to increased segregation with
higher impacts in markets with greater competition.
In the second chapter I study the consequences of increased competition and geographic
vi
differentiation resulting from the deregulation of the Chilean college market and the in-
crease in government scholarships and loans. We study the effects of these changes in
market characteristics on the efficiency of the higher education system and the accessi-
bility and quality of colleges. We estimate a sorting model to account for vertical and
horizontal dimensions of differentiation and quantify the quality of public and private col-
leges. We find that most of the growth in enrollment comes from elite institutions that
expand the size of existing programs and private universities that almost doubled their
enrollment and at the same time doubling on average the number of programs offered. We
calculate substitution patterns for when a program increase its quality. We find significant
substitution between middle tier programs, whereas top tier universities tend to substitute
mainly from other programs in that same range.
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CHAPTER 1 : School Segregation in the Presence of Student Sorting and
Cream-Skimming: Evidence from a School Voucher Reform
1.1. Introduction
Educational reforms in numerous countries introduce competition between schools by in-
creasing parental choice via school vouchers.1 In theory, increased competition between
educational institutions should result in the provision of better school quality to attract
students.2 However, there is concern that school choice programs may increase social
stratification in education systems and weaken public schools if higher-income students
migrate to private voucher schools (Manski, 1992; Epple and Romano, 1998; Nechyba,
1999). Indeed, previous studies have shown that private voucher schools ended up serving
a wealthier population at the expense of public schools, leading to increased socioeco-
nomic segregation across schools (Gauri, 1999; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; Chakrabarti,
2013; Contreras et al., 2010). Entry of private schools has been associated with strati-
fication, consistent with private schools cream-skimming high income students from the
public sector (McEwan et al., 2008). Such increased segregation may be an important
contributor to long-run inequality. Studies on school desegregation plans in the late 1960s
and 1970s have linked increased school segregation with increased criminal activity, lower
educational attainment for minorities, and lower graduation rates (Guryan, 2004; Weiner
et al., 2009; Billings et al., 2014). This paper examines the demand and supply-side mecha-
nisms behind observed increases in socioeconomic segregation resulting from school choice
1Chile, The Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Colombia, and the U.S
have all implemented school choice programs of different scales.
2The case for educational vouchers and increased educational choice was initially made initially by
Friedman (1962). Yet, empirical evidence does not show systematic effects in achievement or efficiency in
either direction. Results depend on the context and design of the choice program and are heterogeneous
across different groups. Hoxby and Murarka (2009) study charter schools in New York City, and Hoxby
and Rockoff (2004) study charter schools in Chicago finding modest gains. Rouse (1998) studies a voucher
program in Milwaukee and finds no effects on reading, but significant effects on math. Angrist et al. (2002)
examine vouchers in Colombia, finding large positive effects. Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2015)
analyze voucher experiments in India and find no effect on test scores, except for Hindi, but they also show
that private schools spend much less than public schools. Several papers have studied the Chilean voucher
program implemented in 1981, finding no evidence that choice improved average educational outcomes
(Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006).
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programs. Separate empirical identification of these mechanisms is challenging because
demand and supply are simultaneously determined and only equilibrium outcomes are
observed. On the supply side, private schools may have incentives to select higher-income
students to improve overall test results.3 On the demand side, the potential effects of
school choice programs on segregation depend on parents’ preferences for different school
characteristics and peer composition. Heterogeneous preferences across different socioe-
conomic groups may explain how parents sort across different schools. For instance, high-
income parents may focus more on school quality, while low-income parents may focus
more on convenience factors, such as distance. Furthermore, high correlation between
socioeconomic status and test scores, make it difficult to disentangle whether parents care
more about test scores or peer quality. To measure the relative importance of these mecha-
nisms on segregation, I exploit a 2008 reform to the Chilean voucher system.4 This reform
changed the previous flat voucher (same per-student amount across schools) to a two-tier
voucher based on students’ socioeconomic status (SES), with a larger voucher for low-SES
students. This allows me to test for cream-skimming behavior among private schools and
examine how low-SES students respond to the resulting decrease in admission restrictions
to private schools. Cream-skimming in this context refers to private schools’ preferential
selection of students based on their socioeconomic characteristics. Moreover, the reform
allowed schools to choose whether they wanted to participate in the new program (SEP
schools) or opt out (non-SEP schools), separating private subsidized schools in two groups.
This induced resorting of students that led to increased overall segregation. I estimate a
model of school choice that incorporates admission restrictions at private schools based on
student socioeconomic characteristics and allows for heterogeneous parental preferences
for school characteristics and peer composition. This contrasts with previous work that
3Numerous studies show that family income and parental education are the main factors explaining
student achievement and standardized test results. Thus private schools may attract parents and students
on the basis of superior average levels of test scores, but higher average test scores may be explained by
sorting of self-selected high achievers, so schools may not be actually adding more value (Abdulkadiroglu
et al., 2014; Cullen et al., 2006)
4Chile is one of the few countries that has a nation-wide voucher program which has been in place
since 1981. This makes it particularly suitable to studying student sorting and segregation in educational
markets.
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assumes that parents can choose any school they are willing to travel to and pay for which
attributes any sorting pattern observed in the data to demand-side preferences, rather
than school selection. 5 This is inconsistent with the evidence on school behavior and
observed stratification in the Chilean system. I show that ignoring admission restrictions
significantly underestimates low-SES parents’ preferences for school quality.
I provide strong evidence that private schools engage in substantial cream-skimming. I
model schools’ admissions process in terms of a threshold in admitted student’s maternal
education, a proxy for SES. While school admission thresholds are endogenous to student
sorting, the timing of the 2008 reform allows me to test for cream-skimming behavior.
I show that admission thresholds decreased significantly following the reform, even for
schools that did not charge any tuition. Consequently, low-SES parents who faced strict
admission restrictions from private schools had more schools available to choose from after
the reform. This resulted in a 10 percentage points increase in the probability of low-SES
students enrolling in private subsidized schools. In the estimation of parental preferences,
I use observed admission thresholds for private subsidized schools to account for school
selection.
The reform constitutes an exogenous shock to schools’ incentives to select more vulnerable
students, uncorrelated with parent’s preferences. Changes in SEP schools’ admission
thresholds, in response to the new voucher, create variation in school peer composition.
I use this variation to estimate parents’ preferences for school characteristics and peer
quality, 6 and to study the effects of post-reform enrollment changes on segregation. I
show that low-SES parents care about quality characteristics like test scores, class size,
and peer quality. At the same time, high-SES parents have strong preferences for high-SES
peers. A one standard deviation increase in peer quality gives 10 times as much utility to
5Hastings et al. (2005), Neilson (2013), and Gallego and Hernando (2010) also estimate parental pref-
erences for school characteristics based on choices of schools, looking at heterogeneity in preferences across
socio-economic groups. Several other papers estimate parent preferences for schools based on residential
location (Black, 1999; Bayer et al., 2007).
6In this setting, by peer quality I mean peer socioeconomic status given by the mother’s education. At
first grade admissions there is no information about student ability or test scores.
3
high-SES parents, as a one standard deviation increase in school average test scores.
These results point to two different effects of the Chilean reform on student sorting. First,
the reform directly impacted cream-skimming behavior at private subsidized SEP schools.
This decreased admission thresholds which together with low-SES parents’ preferences for
better schools account for higher enrollment of low-SES students in private subsidized SEP
schools following the reform. Second, there was an indirect effect induced by changes in
peer composition in SEP schools that accounts for the increased enrollment of high-SES
students in private subsidized schools that opted out of the reform (Non-SEP schools).
This is explained by strong preferences for better peers among high-SES parents.
These two changes in student sorting followed very distinct patterns. The first effect,
caused by the change in incentives for private SEP schools, results in a discrete jump in the
probability of low-SES students going to a SEP school immediately after the reform. The
second effect is caused by a response of high-SES parents to changes in peer characteristics
in SEP-schools, resulting from the first effect. This generated a gradual increase in the
probability of high-SES students choosing a non-SEP school in the years following the
reform. Overall, this resulted in increased socioeconomic segregation, particularly in more
competitive educational markets.
My model shows that heterogeneous preferences for high-SES peers seem to be the main
driver behind segregation. I show that eliminating cream-skimming by schools may fur-
ther increase migration of students from public to private schools, with only a moderate
decrease on segregation. Policy makers may have major challenges in reducing segregation
if preferences for peer quality are so large for high-SES parents. This could be especially
critical given evidence that school segregation perpetuates long-term income inequality
(Benabou, 1996).
My results fill a gap in the literature because little is known about the consequences of such
reforms on school stratification, and about how private schools respond to such policies.
4
Nechyba (2009) argues that cream-skimming can be alleviated through the careful design
of school choice programs, and that efficient programs should incentivize competition
through innovation and increased resource efficiency, rather than through selecting the
best students from public schools. Several studies have suggested deviating from the flat
voucher. For example, Neal (2002) and González et al. (2004) argue that vouchers that
fall in value as household income rises may partially offset incentives to cream-skim for
competitive advantage. The Chilean reform we examined here did effectively decreased
cream-skimming, but had little effect on overall segregation. Though the reform sought
to decrease inequality by giving more resources to schools serving low-SES students, it
ignored the possibility of student resorting.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides institutional
background on Chile’s educational system and the 2008 reform. Section 1.3 describes the
data. Section 1.4 provides a descriptive analysis of changes in school composition, and
schools’ participation decisions. Section 1.5 describes the demand model in the presence
of cream-skimming and provides a simple framework for modeling admissions policies.
Section 1.6 shows the estimation results and counterfactuals. Section 1.7 offers a summary
and conclusions.
1.2. Background in Chile
Chile implemented a nationwide school voucher program in 1981 to introduce school choice
and decentralize educational services in 1981. Under this program, students freely chose
between public and private schools. Private schools that did not charge tuition began
to receive from the government, the same per-student voucher as did the public schools.
If a student decided to move to another school, the new school would receive the entire
subsidy. Tuition-charging private schools continued to operate mostly without public
funding, staying mainly unaffected by the reform. This reform also included decentralized
public school administration, transferring responsibility for public school management
from the Ministry of Education to local municipalities. Public schools continued to be
5
funded centrally, but municipalities began to receive the per-student voucher for every
child attending their schools, just as for private subsidized schools. As a result, enrollment
losses would now directly affect their education budgets.
This voucher system separated the financing from the provision of education, and created
incentives for the private sector to expand their role as provider. The share of private
schools in Chile’s education system grew dramatically: more than 1,000 private schools
entered the market, increasing enrollment in private subsidized schools from 15 to 40% in
20 years. This shift was more notable in larger, more urban, and wealthier communities
(Patrinos and Sakellariou, 2009; Elacqua et al., 2011). Figure 1 shows the evolution in the
share of public and private schools from 1979 to 2012. The share of students in private
schools rose to over 50% of all students in 2012. Public schools had a little over 40% of
students and about 7% went to private non-subsidized schools.
In 1994, with the establishment of the “Financiamiento Compartido” program, private
subsidized schools were allowed to charge a top-up in addition to the voucher. Still, more
than half of these schools did not charge anything. Figure 2 shows the distribution of
average tuition in private subsidized schools in 2007.
An extensive literature has studied the Chilean voucher program. A comparison of stan-
dardized test scores obtained by private and public schools shows that private subsidized
schools have obtained consistently and significantly better results than public schools, but
these results stem from the lack of random assignment of students to schools. Bellei (2005)
outlines some reasons why it is difficult to make comparisons between public and private
schools in Chile: private schools tend to be located in urban areas and serve middle to
middle-high-income students. Contreras et al. (2010) show that the public-private test
score gap drops to zero after controlling for family and school characteristics, and student
selection criteria. Thus there is no evidence that, on average private subsidized schools
perform better than public schools. Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) find no evidence that choice
improved average educational outcomes as measured by test scores, repetition rates, and
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years of schooling. They also show that the voucher program led to increased sorting,
where the main effect of unrestricted school choice was an exodus of middle-class students
from the public to the private sector. Contreras et al. (2010) offer evidence that private
subsidized schools were more selective than public schools. Facing excess demand, the
better private subsidized schools practiced screening, seeking to select the best students.
As a result, private subsidized schools ended up serving a better-informed and wealthier
population, at the expense of municipal schools that served the less-well-off.
1.2.1. The 2008 Reform: SEP Law
In response to critics of the old voucher system, in February 2008, Chile adopted a new
policy creating a targeted schooling subsidy at the most vulnerable students (SEP law,
for Subvencion Escolar Preferencial). The main objective of the reform was to decrease
education inequality.
The SEP reform modified the existing flat subsidy per student by introducing a two-tier
voucher, with a higher subsidy for the most vulnerable students. The main purpose of the
program was to improve equity within the education system, promote equal opportunity,
and improve the quality of education (Weinstein et al., 2010). Starting in 2008, schools
received an extra voucher for students defined as priority by the SEP law.
In addition, participating schools were required to design and implement a plan for edu-
cational improvement. These schools were also required to accept the value of the voucher
as full payment of tuition for preferential students, eliminating extra tuition and other
fees for eligible students.
The monthly values of the extra subsidy are defined by the government and are adjusted
for inflation every year, same as the original subsidy. These values are described in Table
1.7
7In addition, more resources were given to schools having a high concentration of priority students.This
is also described in the second part of Table 1, which shows the resources assigned according to the
concentration of SEP students in the school, on top of the baseline SEP subsidy.
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Student eligibility for the SEP voucher was determined annually according to several
criteria. By 2012, 44% of elementary students were classified as eligible for the SEP
benefits. SEP eligible students are drawn from families in:
a) The program Chile Solidario (a social program for the most vulnerable families in the
country).
b) The first section of the public health system (a classification of beneficiaries of the
health system according to household income).
c) The most vulnerable 33% according to the Ficha de Proteccion Social (FPS).
d) If a student did not qualify under the first three, other criteria were taken into ac-
count including family income and education of the parents, evaluated by the Ministry of
Education using the FPS.
Schools have the choice to register in the SEP program and only participating schools
receive the SEP benefits. If a school chooses not to participate, it cannot receive the
benefits even if it admits priority students. SEP schools are require to adhere to several
conditions. These include submitting an annual report on the use of SEP resources, pre-
senting a plan for educational improvement, and establishing academic goals. Moreover,
SEP schools must exempt eligible students from any out-of-pocket expenses, and cannot
discriminate based on academic performance in the admissions process. Finally, the funds
must be destined to measures approved in the school’s educational improvement plan. In
terms of enrollment, virtually all public schools and more than 60% of private subsidized
are registered in the SEP program.
1.3. Data
My empirical analysis rely on data on student enrollment together with school and student
characteristics. I uses four datasets. The first is a comprehensive dataset on yearly school
and student-level data from 2005 to 2012. It contains the universe of students and the
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schools where they are enrolled, along with school characteristics. It reports the type of
school, the concentration of SEP students in each school, which schools are registered in
the SEP program, and the total money received from the program each year.
I use two additional datasets to construct school characteristics, like average test scores,
pupil-teacher ratios. First, a dataset containing SIMCE test results of all 4th grade stu-
dents from 2005 to 2012. The SIMCE is a standardized test taken by all 4th graders in the
country. Additionally I use data on teacher contracts for all public and private subsidized
schools to construct pupil-teacher ratios. This data includes details about the number of
teachers in each school and the hours in each contract.
Additionally, I use student demographic characteristics like family income, parental edu-
cation, whether they have a computer and internet at home. This information is included
in a questionnaire sent to the families of students taking the SIMCE test. The question
about family income does not ask exact income, but rather people report intervals between
$100 and $200 dollars. To calculate average family income per school, I assign to each
student the mean income in the corresponding bin.
My analysis focuses on about 230,000 students per year in public and private subsidized
schools.8 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for student characteristics in private subsi-
dized and public schools before the program started in 2007. Student differences in the
two types of school are apparent, with students in private schools coming from wealth-
ier families with more educated parents. The table also reports descriptives statistics in
2012, showing that average family income and parental education decreased in both types
of school. This is a result of student redistribution, as I will explain below.
Table 3 describes the number of schools by year and type of school, and from 2008, the
number of schools registered in the SEP program. Almost all public schools, and more
than 2/3 of the private subsidized schools, participated in the SEP program after 2008.
8I exclude private fee-paying schools from the analysis below. These schools charge high tuition and do
not receive any public funding, so they were mainly unaffected by the reform. They serve less than 8% of
students, a share that did not change during the study period.
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1.3.1. Market Definition
In this setting, there is no clear market definition because students are free to choose
a school without any geographic or administrative constraints. Distance is obviously a
relevant variable, but how much students are willing to travel might depend on the region.
I define markets using data on student travel distance. For each school I join all munici-
palities where 5% or more of the students in that school live. This creates a network of
municipalities that constitute a market. There are a total of 70 non-overlapping markets
under this definition.
Table 12 shows the list of municipalities in each market.
1.4. Stylized Facts
1.4.1. Changes in Enrollment
There are important student redistribution patterns following the 2008 reform between the
three types of schools: public, private subsidized that chose to participate in the program
(private SEP schools), and private subsidized that chose to opt out of the program (private
non-SEP schools).
Average first grade enrollment in different types of school are presented in Figure 3. It
provides the coefficients of a regression of average first grade enrollment on school and
year fixed effects, so it represents average changes within school.9
AverageEnrollmentjt = γj + ηt + εjt
The share of students at public schools steadily declined before and after the reform. In
9Changes in enrollment in this section are detrended for demographic country-level changes. Unrelated
to this reform, there are long-term demographic trends of reduced number of children in the country. This
has mostly impacted public school enrollment.
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contrast, private subsidized schools increased their share of students around the time of
the reform both in SEP and non-SEP schools. The new program created incentives for
private subsidized SEP schools to admit more vulnerable students. This explains increased
enrollment for private SEP schools that are willing to admit low-SES students from public
schools. On the other hand, increased enrollment in private subsidized non-SEP must be
explained by changes in school characteristics or peer composition given that these schools
are not directly affected by the reform and incentives of those schools are unchanged.
Changes in enrollment were not homogeneous across types of students, and they occurred
at different times. I use mother’s education as a proxy for the socioeconomic type. The
probability of going to each type of school for different student types by year is shown in
Figure 4. The probability of going to a public school dropped significantly for students in
the bottom half of the distribution, with a correspondent rise of similar magnitude in the
probability of going to a private subsidized SEP school.
The increase of about 10 percentage points in low-SES students’ probability of going to a
private SEP school occurred in a discrete way, right from the first year after the reform.
This suggests that private SEP schools started admitting students they had not admitted
before, given the rise in the value of the voucher. Further, it shows that students in
the bottom half of the distribution suddenly chose to enroll in private subsidized schools
suggesting that their previous enrollment in public school was likely determined by their
inability to meet private schools admissions thresholds.
Additionally, students in the middle-high part of the distribution were increasingly likely
to go to a private non-SEP school following the reform, in contrast with the sharp rise
in the probability of enrollment in private SEP for low-SES students. This gradual rise
in probability of going to private subsidized non-SEP schools for more educated parents
has to be explained by changes in characteristics in the private SEP schools following the
reform. If high-SES parents have preferences for peer quality, the changes in admissions
by private SEP schools led high-SES parents to stop choosing private SEP schools and
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enroll instead in private subsidized non-SEP schools.
The SEP reform sought to decrease educational inequality by giving more resources to
schools that served the more vulnerable population. However, policy makers did not
consider the consequences that student resorting may have had on overall segregation.
The SEP reform created incentives to decrease the cream-skimming behavior of private
schools selecting students with higher socioeconomic characteristics. This resulted in a
large migration of students from public schools, leaving only the most vulnerable students
in public schools. On the other hand, it allowed private schools with higher proportion
of high-SES students to opt out of the program, attracting more high-SES students. In
sum, the program seems to have mainly caused a redistribution of the most vulnerable
students between some private schools and public schools. Moreover, it kept higher-income
students in the non-SEP private subsidized schools and the most vulnerable students in
public schools.
Table 2 shows the differences in average family characteristics between public and private
schools in 2007 and 2012, before and after the reform. It is clear that, in 2007 private
subsidized schools served a wealthier and more educated population and obtained higher
average test scores, compared to public schools. By 2012, the differences in parental
education and family income were larger than 2007, but the gap in test scores dropped
significantly, suggesting that the extra resources from the program had a positive effect
on achievement.
1.4.2. Segregation Measures
In this section, I define the measures I use to quantify segregation. Following Hsieh and
Urquiola (2006), we compare the average mother’s education in public schools with the
average in the market where the school operates. To this end, I calculate for each market-
year, the ratio of average mother’s education in public schools compared to the market
average. Values closer to one reflect more integrated markets and lower values reflect more
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segregated markets. Notice that the measure is not bounded by one. If public schools had
the most educated parents in the market the measure would be larger than one, reflecting
segregation in the opposite way.
Figure 5 shows the average ratio from 2005 to 2012. The average type of student in
public schools decreased in comparison with the market average, reflecting less integrated
markets. It looks like the reform did not reverse the prior trend of increasing segregation.
Segregation may differ with market competitiveness. More competitive markets have a
larger presence of private subsidized schools and are less concentrated in terms of market
share. I separate markets into three groups depending on how concentrated they are,
using the Herfindahl Index (HHI). This measure is calculated as the sum of the square
of the market shares for each market and each year. Therefore, it reflects the level of
concentration in the market, where a higher index is associated with more concentrated
markets.
Average change within market of the ratio of the average mother’s education in public
schools to the market average for the three groups of markets is shown in Figure 6. Results
show that segregation levels in 2005 were already lower in more competitive markets. This
reflects the greater segregation in more competitive and larger markets. Furthermore,
the drop during this period was larger in more competitive markets, consistent with the
changes in enrollment shown above.
Additionally, dispersion of student types within schools reflect market stratification. If
markets become more stratified, we would expect a decrease in the dispersion of student
types within a school. I measure dispersion using the interquartile range (IQR) in each
school, calculated as the difference between the 25th and 75th percentile. I then run the
following regression to capture changes within schools for each type of school.
IQRjt = γj + ηt + εjt
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Table 4 shows the coefficients for the year fixed effects that represent the average change
in IQR within school compared to 2005. Consistent with the changes in enrollment shown
above, public and private SEP schools had lower student dispersion within school, while
no significant change was seen in dispersion in private non-SEP schools.
Several mechanisms could explain these changes in enrollment. On the supply side, schools
may be changing their admission decisions in response to the program. Additionally,
changes in school characteristics or peer composition could have changed parent sorting.
To explain what drives parents’ enrollment decisions, we must model their preferences for
school characteristics and peer quality. From the discrete changes in enrollment for low-
SES parents, shown in Figure 4, it looks like low-SES parents’ decisions were constrained
by private school selection thresholds. If this was the case, we need to account for this
restriction in order to correctly estimate preferences.
1.4.3. School Participation in the SEP Program
An important feature of the SEP program is that it gives schools the option to participate
in the program. A school’s decision to participate in the SEP program depends on several
factors: the percentage of eligible students it has, the effect its choice may have on its
current and future student body, and the costs associated with the program. To receive the
voucher from eligible students, schools must be registered in the SEP program. Therefore,
the fact that some private subsidized schools that have priority students still choose to opt
out and forgo the new voucher, reflect some costs associated with joining the program.
I analyze the school and market characteristics that determine a school’s decisions to enter
the program with a probit model described in Equation (1). Here 1(SEP -School jm) is an
indicator equal to one if school j in market m participates in the SEP program. Xjm is
a vector of school characteristics including average family income in 2007, test results in
2006 and 2007, proportion of low income students in 2007, school size in 2007, proportion
of students with a computer at home and the proportion of students with internet at
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home, and the average size of the class. Also, Zm is a vector of market controls, including
three measures of competition in market m. The level of competition in the market might
affect participation decisions if schools take other schools’ decisions into consideration
when making their own participation decision. The three measures are the proportion of
private schools, proportion of low income students, and the Herfindahl index in market
m.
1(SEP -School
jm
) = α+ βXjm + γZm + εjm (1.1)
Lower average income, higher proportion of low income students, bigger class size, and
more concentrated markets, all imply a higher probability of participation. Table 5 shows
probit estimation results, and the marginal effects at the means of the other variables.
Interestingly, the probability of entering the SEP program decreases with the competi-
tiveness of the market where the school operates. This might be explained by the risk
of losing their high-SES students to competitors. If high-SES students have a preference
for better peers, they may prefer schools that opt out of the program. Students in more
competitive markets have more choice about where to go. Therefore, for any given school,
the risk increases with the competitiveness of the market. This is consistent with the
results from preference estimation that are explained in Section 6.
1.5. Demand Model for School Choice
Section 4 established two main patterns of sorting following the SEP reform. (1) Low-SES
students enrolled in private subsidized SEP schools instead of publics schools, and (2)
middle-SES students went to private subsidized non-SEP schools instead of private SEP
schools. Different demand and supply mechanisms could drive these sorting patterns:
changes in schools selection policies, tuition differences, changes in school characteristics,
and peer composition.
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First, in subsection 5.1 I show evidence of private schools’ cream-skimming behavior in
terms of socioeconomic characteristics, and how this behavior changed following the re-
form. In particular, I show that mother’s education is a good proxy for the characteristics
that are relevant for admissions, and that there is a discrete drop in admission thresholds
after a school register in the SEP program. This explains the higher enrollment of low-SES
students in private subsidized SEP schools.
Next, I model parents’ decisions as a discrete choice of a single school from their mar-
ket. The reform changed important school characteristics and peer composition providing
variation in average student type, class size, pupil-teacher ratio, and test scores. I use this
variation to identify preference parameters in the parents’ utility function.
Additionally, it is important to account for the admission restrictions of private schools
to properly estimate preferences. That is, the choice set may be different for low-SES
parents than for high-SES parents, because even if some schools were free, they might not
admit some students based on their socioeconomics characteristics. To account for such
cream-skimming restrictions, I use mother’s education as a proxy for student type and
assume that private schools selected students based on this observed characteristic.
Two types of schools interact in each market, public and private subsidized schools. Public
schools accept any student that wants to attend, but private schools have an ability to
select students. Assuming that private schools prefer higher to lower types and that they
have limited capacity, I model the admissions process in private subsidized schools in
terms of a threshold (θ∗j ) for admissions on the type of students they admit. I assume that
each school accepts any student that applies as long as his type is above the threshold.
Even though this is a simplification of the attributes that schools care about, in the next
subsection I show that mother’s education constitutes a good proxy for admission policies
based on socioeconomic characteristics. I show evidence of cream-skimming in private
schools and how this threshold changed following the reform, even for schools that did not
charge tuition.
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Students are characterized by their type θi, given by their mothers’ education. Parents
choose the school that maximizes their utility within the schools in their choice set (θ∗jt ≤
θi). The utility student i gets from attending school j is given by:
Uijt = αpijt +Xjtβ
i − γdijt + ξjt + εijt
where
βi = β̄ + β
oWi
Here, Xjt are school characteristics, dijt is the distance for student i to school j, ξjt is
a year-school specific term that represents unobserved school quality. εijt represents an
unobserved idiosyncratic preference of student i for school j, distributed independently
across schools and students.
In Xj I include several school attributes: the type of school, whether it participates in the
SEP program, the previous years test scores and class size (to measure observed quality
for parents), the previous years peer composition (average and variance of the type of
students in the school), to account for preferences for certain peers beyond their effect
on test scores. I use previous year characteristics on grounds that this is the information
available to parents when making school decisions, and I am abstracting from any social
interactions that may affect the decision.
Furthermore, I assume that the admissions threshold for a school θ∗jt is known. For the
estimation, I use the observed lowest 1% in mother’s education admitted in a school as a
proxy for θ∗jt. This is obviously an endogenous equilibrium outcome. The observed cutoff
could be a school decision to exclude some students or just the last student that chose to
apply to that school. The estimation of θ∗ requires solving a dynamic game between the
competing schools that, for a large number of schools can be impractical.
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Instead, I estimate the parameters from the utility function, considering the pseudo max-
imum likelihood estimator assuming the observed vector of θ∗.
If we assume that εij is distributed type I extreme value, this produces a logit functional
form for the probability that student i of choosing school j.
Pij = P (j|θ∗, ξ,Wi) = 1(θi > θ∗j )
exp(vij)
1 +
∑
k∈J(θi) exp(vik)
Here
vij = αpij +Xjβ
i − γdij + ξj
and J(θi) is the choice set of schools available for a student of type θi.
Since only differences in utility matter, it is necessary to normalize the utility for one
alternative to zero. Since in each market there are many schools, most of them very
small, and there is no outside option (everyone must choose a school and I observe the
complete market), I take a third of the public schools in each market to normalize the
utility. I assume that this group of schools share the same unobserved quality term. In
the estimation, I control for observable characteristics of these schools in each market.
1.5.1. Schools’ Cream-Skimming Policies
Private subsidized schools comprise a heterogeneous group of schools, including for-profit
and non-profit organizations, religious and non-religious, single schools, and large corpo-
rations with multiple schools. Nonetheless, no matter the form of their objective function,
they all have incentives to select students from higher socioeconomic status. Because most
of these schools do not charge any tuition, discrimination is based on other indicators, one
of the easiest most likely being parental education. Higher parental education is asso-
ciated with better student behavior, more involved parents, the ability to attract better
teachers, higher test scores, etc. This is also supported by the observed stratification
shown in the stylized facts and the extensive political discussions over the implementation
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of mechanisms to deter selection.
The literature that estimates parents’ preferences for school quality assumes that the only
type of selection that schools have is through prices. In this section, I show that private
schools do, in fact, select students based on socioeconomic characteristics. This process
can be modeled as an admissions threshold on the student type that a school is willing
to admit, using mother’s education as a proxy for the student type. To show this, I use
the variation in incentives to schools that participate in the SEP program to lower their
admissions threshold.
I model school admissions processes as a threshold in the type of students admitted in a
school, assuming that if a school is being selective in the enrollment, it prefers higher to
lower types. I define a student’s type as the education of the mother (the results are very
similar if instead I take family income or socioeconomic status constructed using factorial
analysis), and I use as the admissions threshold, the lowest 1% of mother’s education in
each school each year (θ∗jt).
To show that student type is an effective proxy for private school selection process, I show
changes in θ∗jt with capacity increases (when a school adds another classroom) or when
the value of the per-student subsidy increases. Table 1 shows variation in the value of
the voucher in the studied period. We can also see how θjt changes when a school enrolls
in the SEP program. Figure 7 shows within-school changes in the observed threshold for
private subsidized SEP schools. There is a clear decrease in the threshold following the
reform, but this hides variation in the timing when schools join the SEP program.
I estimate equations 2, 3, and 4 by OLS using school fixed effects, where vt is the value of
the per-student subsidy in year t, and Cjt is the number of classrooms at school j in year
t. Also, 1(SEP -School)jt is an indicator for the year each school enters the SEP program.
θ∗jt = α+ βvt + γj + εjt (1.2)
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θ∗jt = α+ βCjt + γj + εjt (1.3)
θ∗jt = α+ β1(SEP -School)jt + γj + εjt (1.4)
Panel A of Table 6 shows estimation results for equations (1) and (2). The first column
shows how θ∗jt decreases, on average, when a school adds another classroom. This means
that when a school increases its capacity, it is more likely that it will increase its range
for admission.
Panel B of Table 6 shows estimation results for equation (3). The first and second columns
show the results for public schools and private subsidized schools, respectively. We see a
large drop in a school’s admissions threshold after the school enrolls in the reform. Part of
this drop may be explained by a price effect, because the program prevents schools from
charging any tuition to eligible students. Therefore schools that were charging tuition
before 2008 now become free for eligible students. The third column estimates the drop
in the threshold using just the sample of schools that did not charge any tuition before
2008. For these schools there was no price effect. The drop in the threshold is smaller,
but still large and significant.
All regressions include school fixed-effects, so they capture the variation within schools,
when the value of the voucher increases (2), when a school adds another classroom (3),
or when it enters the SEP reform (4). These results suggest that schools are effectively
cream-skimming students, and that mother’s education can usefully proxy for schools’
selection process in admissions.
1.5.2. Estimation and Identification
As explained above, the probability of student i of going to school j is given by:
Pij = P (j|θ∗, ξ,Wi) = 1(θi > θ∗j )
exp(vij)
1 +
∑
k∈J(θi) exp(vik)
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where vij = αpij + Xjβ
i − γdij + ξj , and J(θi) is the choice set of schools available to a
student of type θi.
Xj includes several school-level characteristics: previous year test scores, class size, and
peer composition (average and variance of the type of students in the school).
Parental heterogeneity is reflected in family income levels and mother’s education. For
mother’s education, I include indicators for being in one of four groups: less than eight
years, less than high-school, high-school or more, and university degree. The omitted
category is less than eight years.
These probabilities Pij are conditional on the vector of θ
∗, which is an endogenous equilib-
rium outcome. Let δjt = β̄Xjt+ξjt the year-school specific term that does not vary across
students, and η = [α, γ, β0, δ] the set of parameters to estimate. I define the maximum
likelihood estimator of η from the constrained likelihood (Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2007):
η̂MLE = argmaxL(η,θ
∗) subject to θ∗ = Φ(η,θ∗).
To recover the parameters from the utility function, I consider the pseudo maximum
likelihood estimator assuming the observed vector of θ∗:
η̂ = argmaxL(η,θ∗),
where
L =
I∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
xijlog(Pij)
where xij = 1 if student i chooses school j and 0 otherwise.
The estimation of θ∗ can be impractical for a large number of schools because it requires
the mapping Φ and the Jacobian matrix ∂Φ/∂θ∗.
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For the estimation I proceed in two steps. First I obtain α, γ, and β0 that maximize L,
and following Berry (1994), I estimate δjt matching the observed market shares for each
school to the estimated shares as a function of the parameters in each iteration. This way,
δjt (year-school specific term) allows the model to perfectly match school-level shares.
In the second step, from the panel of δ̂jt and Xjt, I estimate the average utility parameters
β̄ from an OLS regression using school fixed effects to control for unobservable school level
characteristics that may be correlated with Xjt.
Identification of α, γ, β0, and δj is provided by the variation within markets of different
types of students and the variation in enrollments before and after the reform given by the
changes in the choice set for each type of student and the changes in school characteristics
and peer composition. The variation that identifies β̄ comes from the within-school vari-
ation generated by the SEP reform. The identification assumption is that changes in Xjt
are uncorrelated with changes in the unobserved quality ξjt. I also assume that parents
take θ∗ as given, similar to a price taking assumption, I assume that each parent is too
small to have an effect on the admissions threshold. Also, because I use previous years’
characteristics and I assume that this is what parents consider when choosing a school,
and I abstract from any social interactions that may affect the decision.
1.6. Parameter Estimates
My results indicate that it is important to consider the cream-skimming restrictions when
estimating parental preference parameters. Estimates for the average utility parameters
are shown in Table 7. I estimate the model both with and without cream-skimming
restrictions in admissions. The first column shows results of the full model including
the admission restrictions, where each student has a limited number of schools available
depending on his type. The second column shows results without considering restrictions
on the choice set given by the admissions thresholds from the private subsidized schools.
Column 1 of Table 7 shows that parents with low education (the omitted category in
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the parent education group) care about the average type of peers, the homogeneity of
peers in the school (negative coefficient on IQR of peer type), and class size. Column 2
of Table 7 indicates that low-SES parents do not care about class size, and if anything
they dislike higher test scores and higher average peer quality. The differences between
columns 1 and 2 suggest that ignoring access restrictions leads to underestimating low-SES
parents’ preferences for quality. The model rationalizes the enrollment decisions in the
data. In other words, if we ignore the restricted choice set and observe low-SES parents
not selecting high-quality schools even when they are free to choose them, one might infer
that they have low preferences for school quality and peers. Column 1 shows that this is
in fact not true, and this explains the changes in enrollment of low-SES students following
the reform.
Markets differ according to size, competitiveness, and income level, and this may be cor-
related with average utility parameters. For this reason, I estimate parameters separately
for each market and regress each parameter on the log of the Herfindahl Index (HHI),
market size, and average mother’s education in the market. Table 8 shows these results.
A larger parameter on peers is correlated with more concentrated and smaller markets,
and a higher average parental education is correlated with less concentrated and larger
markets, opposite to the parameter on test scores. It appears that parents in more com-
petitive and more educated markets care more about peers and less about standardized
test scores.
My results suggest that parents’ most important consideration is the average type of
students in the school, and the magnitude of this parameter increases with the level of
parental education. Table 9 shows estimates for the heterogeneity parameters α, γ, and
β0 using the model with the restriction on the choice set for each student. Panel A shows
weighted average coefficients by market size for income and education levels. Panel B
shows coefficients for the average person in each group (considering they have average
income for the group). For the best educated parents, a one standard deviation in the
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average type of student gives 10 times as much utility as a one standard deviation in test
scores (1.751 compared to 0.148).
1.6.1. Segregation mechanisms
I use these estimates to quantify how much of the observed segregation in the data is
explained by parental preferences and how much by school cream-skimming behavior. At
first, I assume that parents have no preferences for peer characteristics. Figure 8 shows
the ratio of average student in public schools compared to the market average, and the
share of students in public schools. Shutting down this mechanism increases enrollment in
public schools by 9 percentage points, on average and segregation decreases significantly.
The ratio of student type in public school compared to the market average increasing
approximately from 0.9 to 0.96.
It should be noted that this exercise shuts down only the direct effect of parental pref-
erences for peers, and does not consider any indirect effects. It assumes that thresholds
of admission for schools stay unchanged. Yet, if parents do not care about peers, schools
might change their cream-skimming behavior. In fact, schools might prefer high-SES stu-
dents for several reasons: lower marginal cost (because it could be easier to find teachers
for better students), or if parents care about test scores when selecting a school (this
would be a cheap way to improve achievement). The model is silent about the reasons for
schools engaging in cream-skimming behavior. Therefore, my results represents a lower
bound on the total effect.
In a second exercise I prevent schools from doing any selection in the admissions process,
giving all students the same choice set, assuming no school cream-skimming behavior.
Figure 9 shows the ratio of the average student in public schools compared to the market
average, and the resulting share of students in public schools. Shutting down this mecha-
nism on average decreases public school enrollment by two percentage points. Segregation
decreases, but by much less than in the first exercise, with the student type ratio increasing
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approximately from 0.9 to 0.92.
Table 11 shows the changes in public school market shares and the ratio of student type
in public schools compared to the market average for the two exercises.In a first step, the
model predicts the change in enrollment in one year. Even in this case, I need to assume
capacity constraints for schools which are unobserved. For this exercise I assume that
schools have a maximum capacity equal to the maximum enrollment observed in 2004,
2005, 2006, and 2007 and that they cannot expand beyond this level.
After the first year, the counterfactual exercises become complicated because changing
student allocations in one year changes schools’ characteristics with respect to peers, test
scores, and class size. Therefore, I would need to estimate the choices year by year after
predicting how school characteristics will change. It is likely that, after the first year,
there will be an increase in enrollment in public schools when characteristics of the two
types of schools adjust.
1.7. Summary and Conclusions
This paper studies the mechanisms behind school segregation, using the variation gen-
erated by a reform to the Chilean school voucher system. The reform intervened in the
educational system in an innovative way that makes it useful to study cream-skimming
behavior from private schools. The within school variation in peer composition, class size,
and admission thresholds allows me to estimate parental preferences for school and peer
characteristics.
My main results can be summarized in three points. First, I show that private subsidized
schools effectively cream-skimmed students based on socioeconomic characteristics. Sec-
ond, estimates for parents preferences differ when accounting for supply-side selection in
admissions. Ignoring these restrictions leads to underestimates of preferences for school
and peer quality. My estimates of structural parameters for parent preferences show that
low-SES students care about school quality and better peers. This explains the migration
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of students from public to private subsidized schools. Third, parents all care about better
peers, with magnitudes increasing in parental education and wealth. This explains the
shift of middle income students from private schools that participated in the program
to schools that opted out. It also explains the decision of schools in more competitive
markets to opt out of the reform, seeking to avoid the risk of losing high-SES students.
Previous research has suggested that that cream-skimming concerns can be alleviated
through better program design, for example a tiered voucher system. While this paper
shows that a tiered voucher, in fact, decreases cream-skimming by schools, it shows that
this may have little effect on overall stratification if parents have strong preferences for
better peers.
The results in this chapter also attenuate concerns regarding school choice policies as
responsible for increased socioeconomic segregation. If high-SES parents have such strong
preferences for peers, when school choice is not allowed these parents are always able
to choose the school by choosing the neighborhood where they live. This neighborhood
segregation is observed extensively in countries that do not have school choice policies.
Understanding the role of parental preferences and the mechanisms that underlie school
segregation is crucial to evaluating the potential impact of school choice programs on social
stratification in schools. School socioeconomic segregation is particularly important given
evidence that it can perpetuate long-term income inequality.
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Table 1: Increase in the Value of the Voucher for SEP Students
Preschool to 6th grade
2005-2007 2008-2011 2012
Baseline Subsidy $68 $79 $81
SEP Subsidy $0 $46 $56
% of Priority Students Preschool to 6th grade
15%− 30% $3.6
30%− 45% $6.2
45%− 60% $8.3
> 60% $9.3
Note: This table presents the values for the preferential subsidy for 2008 and 2011,
and the extra voucher the schools get for a high concentration of priority students in
US dollars. Source: Mineduc (2012)
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Table 2: Student Characteristics for Public and Private Subsidized Schools in 2007 and
2012
Student Characteristics in 2007
Public Priv. Subsid. T-Test
Mother’s Education (yrs) 10.29 12.47 -34.24
Family Income (US$) 351.54 629.87 -27.06
Math Score 229.38 251.55 -23.65
Language Score 240.10 260.15 -24.19
Class Size 25.49 25.96 -1.42
Student Characteristics in 2012
Public Priv. Subsid. T-Test
Mother’s Education (yrs) 10.06 12.15 -37.91
Family Income (US$) 294.08 571.40 -28.91
Math Score 246.71 261.27 -18.20
Language Score 253.59 268.41 -20.97
Class Size 23.19 26.29 -11.18
Note: This table presents average statistics in each type of school in 2007 and 2012.
The average is calculated over all students in 4th grade in the school and over the 4
years of the program.
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Table 3: Number of Schools by Type and Year
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total 7,425 7,457 7,896 7,764 7,857 7,890 7,704 7612
Private Non Subsid. 409 399 406 406 401 406 405 393
Private Subsidized 2,694 2,698 2,923 2,936 3,060 3,085 3,094 3,124
Municipal 4,322 4,360 4,567 4,422 4,396 4,399 4,205 4,095
All SEP - - - 6,553 6,629 6,649 6,456 6,328
SEP Private Subsid. - - - 2,137 2,235 2,252 2,253 2,237
SEP Municipal - - - 4,416 4,394 4,397 4,203 4,091
Note: This table presents the number of schools each year by type of school starting
in 2005, and the number of schools enrolled in the SEP program from 2008.
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Table 4: Changes in the Interquartile Range by Type of School Over Time
Public Private SEP Private NonSEP
2006 -0.079* -0.068 0.066
(0.038) (0.048) (0.060)
2007 -0.098* -0.185*** 0.064
(0.039) (0.050) (0.063)
2008 -0.033 -0.165*** -0.079
(0.038) (0.047) (0.061)
2009 -0.145*** -0.173*** -0.018
(0.038) (0.047) (0.061)
2010 -0.158*** -0.298*** -0.085
(0.038) (0.047) (0.061)
2011 -0.196*** -0.293*** -0.040
(0.039) (0.047) (0.061)
2012 -0.147*** -0.277*** 0.004
(0.039) (0.047) (0.061)
Constant 3.950*** 3.464*** 3.273***
(0.027) (0.034) (0.043)
R-squared 0.286 0.295 0.346
N 13331 12181 5293
Note: This table presents average changes in interquartile range
by type of school, in terms of mother’s education. *,**, and ***
denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Standard errors
are presented in parenthesis.
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Table 5: Probit Regression of the Probability of Being a SEP School
Panel A
Probit Regression Coefficients
Average Income -0.208** -0.184** -0.166* -0.203**
(0.090) (0.090) (0.089) (0.090)
Prop. of Low Inc. Stud. 1.488*** 1.560*** 1.470*** 1.416***
(0.342) (0.343) (0.348) (0.348)
Avg. Score in 2006 -0.186*** -0.187*** -0.207*** -0.201***
(0.069) (0.068) (0.070) (0.070)
Avg. Score in 2007 -0.072 -0.071 -0.081 -0.078
(0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Average Class Size 0.172*** 0.166*** 0.186*** 0.184***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047)
Herfindahl Index 2.493*** 2.285***
(0.660) (0.721)
Proportion Private -0.715* -0.040
(0.383) (0.434)
Prop. Low Inc. Market 1.302** 0.743
(0.601) (0.648)
Constant -0.419** 0.060 -1.160*** -0.838
(0.201) (0.310) (0.413) (0.565)
Panel B
Marginal Effects
Average Income -0.070** -0.062** -0.056* -0.068**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Prop. of Low Inc. Stud. 0.499*** 0.526*** 0.495*** 0.474***
(0.114) (0.115) (0.117) (0.116)
Avg. Score in 2006 -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.070*** -0.067***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Avg. Score in 2007 -0.024 -0.024 -0.027 -0.026
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Average Class Size 0.058*** 0.056*** 0.063*** 0.062***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016)
Herfindahl Index 0.836*** 0.765***
(0.220) (0.240)
Proportion Private -0.241* -0.013
(0.129) (0.145)
Prop. Low Inc. Market 0.439** 0.249
(0.202) (0.217)
N 1279 1279 1279 1279
Note: Panel A presents Probit estimation coefficients for private schools of the prob-
ability of being a SEP school on different school and market characteristics. Panel
B presents marginal effects at the average of the other variables. The estimation is
based on school characteristics in 2007. *,**, and *** denotes significance at the 10,
5 and 1% level. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis.
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Table 6: Changes in Admissions Threshold
Panel A: Cutoffs changes with changes in voucher values and school capacity
Dep Variable - Lowest 1% of Student Mother’s Education
Public Schools Priv. Subs. Schools All Schools
Voucher Value 0.158 -1.353***
(0.099) (0.104)
Number of Classes -0.368***
(0.038)
Constant 2.281*** 9.047*** 6.069***
(0.225) (0.239) (0.064)
School FE X X X
R-squared 0.273 0.541 0.742
N 13317 17474 33833
Panel B: Cutoffs changes when a school joins SEP program
Dep Variable - Lowest 1% of Student Mother’s Education
Public Schools Private Subsidized SEP Schools
All Tuition=0
SEP School 0.055 -0.458*** -0.344***
(0.035) (0.044) (0.065)
Constant 3.201*** 5.336*** 4.210***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.047)
School FE X X X
R-squared 0.371 0.527 0.401
N 13246 12181 4824
Note: This table presents changes in the observed lowest 1% in the mother’s education
when school changes capacity (adds another classroom) or increases the value of the
voucher or joins the SEP program. The estimation is based on regression with school
fixed effects to capture variation within schools, showing that this is a good proxy
for the admissions threshold. *,**, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1%
level. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis.
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Table 7: Estimation Results - Average Utility Parameters
Dep Variable: Average Utility (δjt)
Restricted Unrestricted
Class Size -0.004* -0.002
(0.002) (0.003)
Average Peer Type 0.128** -0.183**
(0.045) (0.069)
IQR Peer Type -0.055* -0.038
(0.024) (0.051)
Avg Math Score -0.004 -0.084*
(0.028) (0.043)
SEP School 0.023 0.224
(0.094) (0.228)
Constant -1.668*** -2.057***
(0.024) (0.045)
School FE X X
R-squared 0.848 0.672
N 9665 9665
Note: This table presents regression coefficients of average utility of a
school on different lagged school characteristics: average class size, av-
erage standardized mother’s education, interquartile range of mother’s
education, average standardized math test score, and an indicator for
participating in the reform. It shows estimates for both, the model in-
cluding the restriction on the choice set and for the unrestricted version.
*,**, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Standard
errors are presented in parenthesis.
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Table 8: Heterogeneity of Average Utility Parameters across Markets
Average Peer Type Avg Math Score Class Size IQR Peer Type
Log(HHI) 0.054*** -0.048*** 0.011*** 0.058***
(0.013) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006)
Std Market Size -0.043*** -0.014 0.008*** 0.046***
(0.012) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006)
Std Market Size Sq 0.114*** 0.024*** -0.001* 0.017***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.000) (0.004)
Avg Mother’s Education 0.365*** -0.274*** -0.003* -0.301***
(0.027) (0.017) (0.001) (0.013)
Constant 0.256*** -0.264*** 0.031*** 0.080***
(0.048) (0.031) (0.002) (0.023)
R-squared 0.063 0.034 0.064 0.124
N 9665 9665 9665 9665
Note: This table presents regression coefficients of average utility parameters on different market characteristics:
log of Herfindahl Index, standardized market size, and size squared, and average mother’s education in the market.
*,**, and *** denotes significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Standard errors are presented in parenthesis.
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Table 9: Estimation Results - Heterogeneity Coefficients on Preferences by Income and Mother’s Education
< 8 years High School More than High School University Income
Avg Peer Type 0.211*** 1.041*** 1.751*** 0.743***
(0.047) (0.052) (0.094) (0.058)
Avg Math Score -0.001 0.054 0.148*** 0.101***
(0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.048)
IQR Peer Type -0.016 -0.048 -0.047 0.07
(0.096) (0.102) (0.123) (0.036)
Class Size 0.008 0.021*** 0.017*** 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.002)
Distance 0.023 -0.263*** -0.224*** -0.260*** 0.004
(0.022) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006)
Tuition -0.301*** 0.023 0.003 -0.019*** 0.013
(0.012) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001)
Note: This table presents average heterogeneity coefficients across markets weighted by market size. The model
allows for heterogeneity in preferences depending on income and mother’s education. Income is measured
as a continues variable and mother’s education as an indicator for being in one of four groups. School
characteristics included are average class size, average standardized mother’s education, interquartile range
of mother’s education, average standardized math test score. Also the distance between the school and the
student’s municipality and tuition.
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Table 10: Average Coefficient for Each Mother’s-Education Group
High School More than High School University
Average Peer Type 0.066 1.109 2.342
Avg Math Score -0.102 0.001 0.169
IQR Peer Type -0.076 -0.077 -0.027
Class Size 0.001 0.014 0.012
Distance -0.265 -0.225 -0.261
Tuition 0.014 0.031 -0.011
Note: This table presents average preference parameter for each education group
for the average income for that group in each market. All the estimates in this table
correspond to the full model that includes the restriction on the choice sets depending
on the student type.
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Table 11: Simulation Results - No Preference for Peers
Ratio of Mother’s Education Share of Students in Public Schools
Year Baseline No Pref. for Peers No Cr-Sk Baseline No Pref for Peers No Cr-Sk
2006 0.914 0.962 0.933 0.578 0.660 0.551
2007 0.910 0.962 0.930 0.568 0.654 0.541
2008 0.906 0.958 0.926 0.550 0.632 0.523
2009 0.894 0.949 0.918 0.501 0.584 0.474
2010 0.890 0.954 0.922 0.516 0.601 0.491
2011 0.894 0.951 0.917 0.501 0.587 0.474
2012 0.896 0.954 0.919 0.507 0.596 0.481
Note: This table presents simulation results assuming two different scenarios: first, that parents have no preference
for peers, assuming that admissions thresholds stay unchanged (columns 2 and 5) and assuming no cream-
skimming (columns 3 and 6). It shows averages across markets for the share of the outside option and the ratio
of average mother’s education of students in public schools compared to the market average.
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Table 12: Municipalities by Market
Region Municipality Market Region Municipality Market Region Municipality Market
1 IQUIQUE 1 5 LOS ANDES 17 7 RAUCO 23
1 ALTO HOSPICIO 1 5 SAN ESTEBAN 17 7 ROMERAL 23
1 ARICA 2 5 SAN FELIPE 17 7 SAGRADA FAMILIA 23
2 ANTOFAGASTA 3 5 CALLE LARGA 17 7 TENO 23
2 CALAMA 4 5 PANQUEHUE 17 7 TALCA 24
2 TOCOPILLA 5 5 LLAILLAY 17 7 SAN CLEMENTE 24
3 COPIAPO 6 5 CATEMU 17 7 MAULE 24
3 TIERRA AMARILLA 6 5 PUCHUNCAVI 18 7 PELARCO 24
3 CALDERA 7 5 QUINTERO 18 7 SAN RAFAEL 24
3 DIEGO DE ALMAGRO 8 5 SAN ANTONIO 19 7 SAN JAVIER 25
3 CHANARAL 8 5 SANTO DOMINGO 19 7 VILLA ALEGRE 25
3 HUASCO 9 5 EL QUISCO 19 7 CONSTITUCION 26
3 VALLENAR 9 5 CARTAGENA 19 7 COLBUN 27
4 LA SERENA 10 5 ALGARROBO 19 7 LONGAVI 27
4 COQUIMBO 10 6 CODEGUA 20 7 LINARES 27
4 VICUNA 10 6 RENGO 20 7 YERBAS BUENAS 27
4 ANDACOLLO 10 6 REQUINOA 20 7 PARRAL 28
4 SALAMANCA 11 6 COLTAUCO 20 7 RETIRO 28
4 LOS VILOS 11 6 MOSTAZAL 20 7 CAUQUENES 29
4 ILLAPEL 11 6 MACHALI 20 8 HUALQUI 30
4 CANELA 11 6 RANCAGUA 20 8 TOME 30
4 OVALLE 12 6 GRANEROS 20 8 PENCO 30
4 MONTE PATRIA 12 6 SAN VICENTE 20 8 HUALPEN 30
4 PUNITAQUI 12 6 MALLOA 20 8 TALCAHUANO 30
5 QUILPUE 13 6 DONIHUE 20 8 CONCEPCION 30
5 VILLA ALEMANA 13 6 PICHIDEGUA 20 8 CORONEL 30
5 VINA DEL MAR 13 6 PEUMO 20 8 LOTA 30
5 VALPARAISO 13 6 OLIVAR 20 8 CHIGUAYANTE 30
5 CONCON 13 6 COINCO 20 8 SAN PEDRO DE LA PAZ 30
5 CASABLANCA 14 6 QUINTA DE TILCOCO 20 8 FLORIDA 30
5 QUILLOTA 15 6 LAS CABRAS 21 8 SANTA JUANA 30
5 LA CRUZ 15 6 CHIMBARONGO 22 8 CURANILAHUE 31
5 OLMUE 15 6 SAN FERNANDO 22 8 LOS ALAMOS 31
5 HIJUELAS 15 6 CHEPICA 22 8 LEBU 31
5 LIMACHE 15 6 NANCAGUA 22 8 ARAUCO 32
5 NOGALES 15 6 SANTA CRUZ 22 8 CANETE 33
5 CALERA 15 6 PALMILLA 22 8 LOS ANGELES 34
5 LA LIGUA 16 6 PERALILLO 22 8 NACIMIENTO 34
5 CABILDO 16 7 CURICO 23 8 MULCHEN 34
5 PAPUDO 16 7 MOLINA 23 8 NEGRETE 34
Continued on next page
38
Table 12 – continued from previous page
Region Municipality Market Region Municipality Market Region Municipality Market
8 QUILLECO 34 10 PUERTO MONTT 49 13 COLINA 70
8 SANTA BARBARA 34 10 LLANQUIHUE 49 13 LA PINTANA 70
8 YUMBEL 35 10 LOS MUERMOS 49 13 MAIPU 70
8 CABRERO 35 10 CALBUCO 49 13 RENCA 70
8 PEMUCO 35 10 FRUTILLAR 49 13 SANTIAGO 70
8 YUNGAY 35 10 PUERTO VARAS 49 13 LA FLORIDA 70
8 CHILLAN 36 10 MAULLIN 49 13 PUENTE ALTO 70
8 BULNES 36 10 CASTRO 50 13 PENALOLEN 70
8 SAN CARLOS 36 10 ANCUD 51 13 QUINTA NORMAL 70
8 QUILLON 36 10 DALCAHUE 52 13 SAN BERNARDO 70
8 NIQUEN 36 10 QUELLON 53 13 SAN MIGUEL 70
8 COIHUECO 36 10 OSORNO 54 13 PUDAHUEL 70
8 SAN IGNACIO 36 10 PURRANQUE 55 13 ESTACION CENTRAL 70
8 PINTO 36 10 VALDIVIA 56 13 LO PRADO 70
8 CHILLAN VIEJO 36 10 FUTRONO 57 13 CONCHALI 70
8 SAN NICOLAS 36 10 LAGO RANCO 58 13 NUNOA 70
8 EL CARMEN 36 10 LA UNION 58 13 LA CISTERNA 70
8 LAJA 37 10 RIO BUENO 58 13 QUILICURA 70
9 TEMUCO 38 10 LANCO 59 13 EL BOSQUE 70
9 VILCUN 38 10 PAILLACO 60 13 RECOLETA 70
9 PADRE LAS CASAS 38 10 LOS LAGOS 60 13 CERRO NAVIA 70
9 CUNCO 39 10 MARIQUINA 61 13 LAS CONDES 70
9 GORBEA 40 10 PANGUIPULLI 62 13 SAN JOAQUIN 70
9 FREIRE 40 11 COYHAIQUE 63 13 CERRILLOS 70
9 PITRUFQUEN 40 11 AYSEN 64 13 INDEPENDENCIA 70
9 CURACAUTIN 41 12 PUNTA ARENAS 65 13 LO BARNECHEA 70
9 LAUTARO 41 12 NATALES 66 13 LAMPA 70
9 LONCOCHE 42 13 PENAFLOR 67 13 LO ESPEJO 70
9 CARAHUE 43 13 TALAGANTE 67 13 PROVIDENCIA 70
9 NUEVA IMPERIAL 43 13 PAINE 67 13 PEDRO AGUIRRE CERDA 70
9 TEODORO SCHMIDT 43 13 MELIPILLA 67 13 LA REINA 70
9 CHOLCHOL 43 13 EL MONTE 67 13 HUECHURABA 70
9 TOLTEN 44 13 PIRQUE 67 13 MACUL 70
9 VILLARRICA 45 13 ISLA DE MAIPO 67 13 LA GRANJA 70
9 PUCON 45 13 BUIN 67 13 SAN RAMON 70
9 ANGOL 46 13 PADRE HURTADO 67 13 VITACURA 70
9 ERCILLA 47 13 CALERA DE TANGO 67
9 COLLIPULLI 47 13 MARIA PINTO 67
9 TRAIGUEN 48 13 CURACAVI 68
9 VICTORIA 48 13 TILTIL 69
Note: This table shows the municipalities and markets used in the estimation.
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Table 13: Probability of Switching Schools by Grade and Year
Probability of Switching Schools
SEP Student 0.013***
(0.001)
3 grade 0.001**
(0.001)
4 grade -0.008***
(0.001)
5 grade -0.006***
(0.001)
6 grade -0.013***
(0.001)
7 grade 0.031***
(0.001)
8 grade -0.031***
(0.000)
3 grade*SEP -0.006***
(0.001)
4 grade*SEP -0.007***
(0.001)
5 grade*SEP -0.011***
(0.001)
6 grade*SEP -0.018***
(0.001)
7 grade*SEP -0.007***
(0.001)
8 grade*SEP -0.009***
(0.001)
Constant 0.120***
(0.000)
R-squared 0.003
N 8,418,372
Note: This table shows coefficients of a linear probability model of the probability of switching schools on
indicator for being a SEP student and grade fixed effects.
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Figure 1: Changes in Enrollment by Type of School
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Note: This figure shows the evolution on the share of students that is enrolled in each type of school from
the beginning of the voucher system in Chile.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Average Tuition in 2007
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Note: This figure shows the distribution of average tuition charged by private subsidized schools in US$
in 2007, before the program started. More than half of the schools did not charge any tuition.
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Figure 3: Evolution of First Grade Enrollment in Public and Private Schools
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Note: This figure shows changes in average first grade enrollment within schools. It shows coefficients from
a regression of enrollment on year and school fixed effects.
43
Figure 4: Probabilities of Enrollment by Type of School
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Note: Each graph shows the probabilities for each level of mother’s education of enrolling in different type of school each year. The probabilities are
calculated based on the coefficients from a multinomial logit model where a student has the option of enrolling in four types of schools: public, private
subsidized SEP, private subsidized non-SEP, and private fee-paying schools. The probabilities for the last type of school are not shown here because no
significant changes are observed in this period.
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Figure 5: Changes in Segregation within Markets
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Note: This figure shows average within market changes in the integration measure. The ratio is constructed
as the average student type in public schools over the average student type in the market where the public
schools operate. Higher values mean more integrated markets where public schools have a more represen-
tative student body compared to the market where they operate. Each point in the graph represents the
coefficients of a regression of the ratio on year and market fixed effects.
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Figure 6: Changes in Segregation by Market Concentration
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Note: This figure shows average changes in the ratio of mother’s education within market for three groups
of markets depending on the level of concentration. Concentration in each market was calculated as the
Herfindahl Index, which is equal to the sum of the squares of the shares of each school in the market.
A high index means high concentration which is associated with lower participation of private subsidized
schools. The ratio is constructed as the average student type in public schools over the average student
type in the market where the public schools operate. Each point in the graph represents the coefficients
of a regression of the ratio on year and market fixed effects.
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Figure 7: Admissions Thresholds in Private SEP Schools
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Note: This figure shows average admission thresholds in private subsidized schools in the years before and
after the SEP reform. Each point in the graph represents the coefficients of a regression of the lowest 1%
of mother’s education on year and school fixed effects.
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Figure 8: Segregation with No Preferences for Peers
Panel A: Average Student Type in Public Schools Compared to Average in the Market
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Panel B: Share of Students in Public Schools
.5
.5
5
.6
.6
5
A
vg
 S
ha
re
 o
f S
tu
de
nt
s 
in
 P
ub
lic
 S
ch
oo
l
2006 2008 2010 2012
Year
Baseline No preference for peer quality
Note: This figure shows simulation results assuming that parameters on peer quality are equal to zero.
Panel A shows the ratio of average mother’s education in public schools compared to the market average.
Panel B shows the share of students going to public schools.
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Figure 9: Segregation with No Cream-Skimming
Panel A: Average Student Type in Public Schools Compared to Average in the Market
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Panel B: Share of Students in Public Schools
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Note: This figure shows simulation results assuming no cream-skimming from private subsidized schools.
Panel A shows the ratio of average mother’s education in public schools compared to the market average.
Panel B shows the share of students going to public schools.
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CHAPTER 2 : Competition and the Cannibalization of College Quality 10
2.1. Introduction
Over the last 30 years, the Chilean government deregulated the higher education market.
As a result, universities massively expanded their network of campuses, which intensified
the competition between institutions and rapidly increased enrollment. In 1990, most
Chilean universities were public, and concentrated their activity around one region. Over
the following 20 years, the number of private campuses eligible for government financial aid
nearly doubled, while the fraction of students enrolled in any private university increased
from 25% to 54.3%. At the same time, traditional universities diversified their operation,
and now cover on average two regions through multiple campuses.
From 2001-2010 the average number of campuses increased from 1.57 to 2.56 for public
universities, and from 1.25 to 3.9 for private universities. On average, 84% of students
enrolled at a public university are affiliated with its main campus, compared to nearly
100% in the early 1990s. This trend is even more pronounced among private universities:
58% of their students are affiliated with the main campus (compared to 97% in 1992), and
an average private university is present in four regions (compared to one in 1992).
The Chilean higher-level education system is, like in the U.S., highly decentralized and
competitive. This decentralization can lead to substantial benefits for students, mostly
by lowering tuitions and improving access to education. In this project, we also point
to another effect of competition in this sector. By independently choosing the optimal
size and characteristics of their own campuses, universities ignore the potentially adverse
impact of their actions on competing universities. This stems from the fact that the
quality of universities is in part determined by the quality of students who choose to
enroll (see Epple et al. (2006) for a sorting model in which that is the case). For instance,
the enrollment at new campuses is generated in part by attracting students who would
10The work in this chapter is joint with Chao Fu and Jean-François Houde
50
otherwise be admitted at existing campuses serving the same population. This competition
can in turn force incumbent colleges to reduce their admission thresholds and lower their
quality levels.
This “cannibalization” of school quality caused by competition is analogous to the business
stealing effect of price competition in oligopoly markets with product differentiation (see
Bresnahan (1987) and Berry et al. (1995) for examples in the car market). The main
difference in the education context is that this externality does not only reduces tuitions,
but also affects the quality of colleges. This is in contrast with standard differentiated
product framework, where quality is fixed in the short-run and determined by firms’
investments only.
The importance of this inefficiency depends on the level of spatial and quality differen-
tiation between colleges. The first originates from the fact that students tend to favor
campuses located near their home locations, and the second is due the fact that universi-
ties differ substantially in the quality of their facilities and programs.
In this project we study the consequences of the increase in competition and geographic
diversification on the efficiency of the Chilean higher education system, and in particular
on the accessibility and quality of colleges. We estimate an equilibrium sorting model,
designed to account for both, vertical and horizontal dimensions of differentiation, and
quantify the quality of public and private colleges. We use this model for two purposes.
First, we quantify the evolution over time of the quality of different universities, and
quantify the impact of the Chilean education expansion policy on the distribution of
education quality. Second, we estimate patterns of substitution between programs to have
a measure of cannibalization.
Our results show that a significant part of the growth in enrollment is explained by elite
institutions expanding existing programs and private universities increasing the differen-
tiation of programs offered, with significant entry and exit of programs. The exit and
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entry of new programs is mostly present in private universities. Our model show consid-
erable preference for geographically close programs, and a strong preference of females for
social sciences programs. We find significant substitution between middle tier programs,
whereas programs in the top quartile tend to substitute from other programs in that same
category.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a description
of the trends in the Chilean college market. Section 2.3 describes the data used in this
project. Section 2.4 provides a descriptive analysis of the growth in enrollment. Section 2.5
describes the sorting model with selective programs. Section 2.6 describes the estimation
and identification strategies. Section 2.7 shows the estimation results, and Section 2.8
offers a summary and conclusions.
2.2. Trends in the Chilean College Market
Higher education in Chile went through a radical reform in the early 1980s. This reform
modified the education system structure and its funding mechanisms, resulting in an
expanded, more diverse and highly privatized system.
The number of higher education institutions and enrollment in higher education programs
increased significantly following this reform. In 1980, before this reform, approximately one
out of four people graduating from high school enrolled in some type of higher education,
by 2012 this proportion has increased to more than one out of two.
Currently, the Chilean higher education system is organized in three types of institutions:
universities, professional learning institutes, and technical training centers. By 2012, there
were 60 universities, 45 professional institutes, and 73 technical training centers. The 60
universities are divided in two groups, 25 that existed before the 1980 reform (these
institutions constitute a council called CRUCH,16 are public and 9 are private) and 35
private universities that were created after 1980.
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In the 1990s, higher education policies carried out two major changes in terms of financial
aid programs for postsecondary education. A means-tested loan scheme (FSCU) to cover
tuition fees in one of the traditional universities with a fixed interest rate of two percent
and income contingent repayment. Second, a scholarship scheme for students coming
from low income families was set up to cover partial or total payment of tuition fees.
Financial aid programs have recently expanded. In 2006, a new law established a need-
based student loan system for all accredited institutions (including private institutions
that were not part of traditional universities), complementing existing privately funded
scholarships. The new loan scheme provides qualified students with government backed
student loans to cover their tuition fees.
Also, in 2011 there was an expansion in the generosity of the government grants to include
eligible students up to the third income quintile. As a result, almost half of students
enrolled in higher education receive some type of financial aid, with the majority of this
aid being in the form of loans.
The 25 traditional CRUCH universities plus eight out of the other 35 private universities
share a single admission process based exclusively in a score calculated from a nationwide
admission test (PSU) and high school grades.
The PSU test consists of several parts. Everyone has to take math and language tests, but
social sciences and science tests are optional. Each program has different requirements in
terms of what parts of the test the applicant must take to be able to apply. Each of these
33 universities that participates of the centralized admission process, publicly announces
the number of seats available and the weights to calculate the admission score for each
program. Students apply to up to eight programs ordered by preference, after knowing
their scores. Admission to each program is managed in a centralized way, where each
program is filled by the students with the best scores that applied to that program until
the number of seats are filled.
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2.3. Data
The empirical analysis rely on two datasets. Microdata on student college applications
together with student sociodemographic characteristics for 2012, and aggregate data for
university enrollment from 2005 to 2014, for every university that participates in the
centralized admission process.
The 2012 dataset on student applications contains the universe of students that applied to
some program in one of the 33 universities (25 traditional plus 8 private non traditional)
that participate in the centralized admission process, even if the student was not admit-
ted. The aggregate dataset for the institutions, includes total enrollment and admission
thresholds for every major.
There are more than 2000 majors offered by these 33 universities. We grouped these majors
in 21 categories, so each category is a collection of programs with comparable academic
requirements (weights for each of the admission tests). There are 54 campuses that are part
of these 33 universities. Overall, students have access to 428 choices (campus/category
combination).
The total universe of students considered is every student that took the admission test
each year, about 180,000 student per year.
Table 14 shows the growth in the number of majors and campuses by institution. There
is a large growth in the number of majors offered during this period, mostly in private
non-traditional universities. On average these institutions have approximately 3 campuses
in different regions.
Table 15 shows descriptive statistics for student characteristics in each type of institution
for 2012. Students attending elite institutions are on average comparable to student going
to private universities in family income and mother’s education, but with significantly
better scores and more likely to have a government scholarship.
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2.4. Growth decomposition
During our sample period, there is a significant increase in the share of students enrolling
in higher education and the number of programs offered by universities.
Figure 10 shows the share of students enrolling in higher education programs from 2005
to 2014, where there is a sharp increase, especially after 2011. Furthermore, Figure 11
shows that this growth is mostly coming from private universities.
To understand whether the growth in the number of programs is similar across institu-
tions, first we divide the institutions in four groups. Type 1 institutions are the six elite
universities that usually appear in international rankings (Pontificia Universidad Catolica
de Chile, Universidad de Chile, Universidad de Concepcion, Universidad Tecnica Federico
Santa Maria, Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Valparaiso, and Universidad de Santiago).
Type 2 corresponds to public universities that are not included in the first group. Type 3
are private universities in CRUCH that are not included in the first group, and type 4 are
the eight private non-CRUCH universities that participate from the centralized admission
process. Panel A in Table 16 shows the trends in number of programs for each group. It
is apparent that growth in the number of programs is mostly coming from private uni-
versities, both private-CRUCH and private non-CRUCH. The average annual growth in
number of programs is 4.4% in group 3 and 5.9% in group 4.
Second, we look at enrollment for these same groups (Table 16, panel B). Enrollment has
increased by about 50% in elite institutions (group 1), and considering that they did not
increase significantly the number of programs offered, this means that existing programs
are becoming larger on average in these institutions. Enrollment in public universities
(group 2), was decreasing significantly from 2005- 2009 and started increasing again in
2010 probably due to the increase in generosity of government grants. Group 3 institutions
follow a similar trend than elite institutions. The largest growth in enrollment comes from
private non-CRUCH universities (group 4) that almost doubled their enrollment in 10
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years.
Next, we divide the sample period in two periods. Period 1 from 2005-2009 and period
2 from 2010-2015 and we look at what part of this growth is explained by incumbent
programs, and entry/exit of programs.
Table 17 shows this decomposition of growth in total enrollment for each of the two periods.
Total growth corresponds to 10.4% in the first period and 17.9% in the second one. In
total, incumbent programs decreased in enrollment and most of the growth is explained
by entry of programs. Nevertheless, when looking at different type of institutions, this
decomposition looks very different. For elite institutions, more than 50% of the growth
is explained by growth of incumbent programs (56% in period 1 and 54% in period 2),
whereas for the rest, most of the growth is explained by entry, especially in the second
period.
We can also look at the growth in the average program size and how entrants and exits
compared to incumbents. Table 18 shows this decomposition. Growth is defined as growth
in enrollment and it is calculated as the average growth in the number of students in an
individual major for each of the four groups. The average growth is decomposed between
average growth of incumbent programs, growth explained by entry of programs larger
than the average, and exit of programs smaller than the average. Incumbent programs in
elite and private non-traditional universities seem to have grown during both periods. On
the other hand, for all institutions, new programs are smaller than the average and the
programs existing are also smaller than the average.
If we look at the information in Table 18 in combination with Table 17, it seems like
private non-traditional universities are opening a significant number of small programs
and at the same time increasing the size of incumbent programs. Public universities that
are not included in the first group, are decreasing enrollment overall, mostly explained by
incumbent programs, but nevertheless opening a large number of small programs.
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Table 19 shows changes in the minimum test score in programs in each of the four groups.
Given the large increase in the size of programs in institutions in group 1, it is expected
that admission thresholds decrease in this group. Institutions in groups 2 and 3, have
maintained similar trends with the difference that public institutions have not increased
their enrollment in a way that would explain this decrease. Private non-CRUCH uni-
versities show an impressive increase in their thresholds having the lowest scores at the
beginning of the period and the second highest by after 2010. This is even more impressive
considering that they have almost doubled their enrollment over this period.
Table 20 shows the decomposition of the changes in thresholds.The Olley-Pakes decom-
position shows that on aggregate, thresholds decrease in 5.6 points. When we look at the
aggregate decomposition, the unweighted average shows a decrease in 2 points, showing
that larger programs decreased their threshold about 3 points more. If we look at the
same decomposition, but within the four groups defined above, they look very different,
but in all cases, larger programs decreased their thresholds more relative to the average
(negative within covariance).
2.5. A Sorting Model of College Enrollment
We develop a short-run model describing the allocation of students to campuses, and the
endogenous determination of admission thresholds. The model has three components: (i)
students preferences, (ii) the admission process, and (iii) market clearing conditions. We
describe each in turn.
2.5.1. Student Preferences
When deciding which college to attend, we assume that students trade-off the convenience
of each option, with the quality and cost of the education provided. This modeling frame-
work has been used recently by researchers to study demand for schools, mostly in the
context of elementary schools (e.g. Hastings et al. (2009), and Neilson (2013)). It is
closely related to models of product differentiation used in the Industrial Organization
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literature (e.g. Berry et al. (1995)). In contrast, the sorting model provided Epple et al.
(2006) imposes a common quality ranking across colleges, and assumes that students sort
between college options solely based on quality and prices.
Student Characteristics
Students are characterized by different gender (g) , family income (y), home location (l) ,
abilities (a) and academic interests.
Let (j,m) index each option (university, category), and J denotes the set of options
available. Admissions are subject to program-specific standards. An outside option is
available to all students.
Program characteristics are given by admission requirements ωj (weights on each test and
high-school GPA), pj (price), location (lj) .
A student has multi-dimensional knowledge in subjects such as math, language, social
sciences and science, summarized by s = [s1, s2, ..., sS ], the vector of test scores. Vari-
ous elements of such knowledge are combined with the publicly known category-specific
weights to form category-university-specific application test score,
tij =
S∑
l=1
ωjlsil,
where ωj = [ωj1, ..., ωjS ] is the vector of univerity-category-j-specific weights and
∑S
l=1 ωjl =
1. ωj ’s differ across categories: for example, an engineer uses math knowledge more and
language knowledge less than a journalist. Notice that abilities are correlated across ma-
jors as multi-dimensional knowledge is used in various majors.
Given the different academic tracks they follow in high school, some students will consider
only majors that emphasize knowledge in certain subjects, while some are open to all
majors. Such general interests are reflected in their abilities and choices of which tests to
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take.11 Let Mt be the set of categories within the general interest of a student with test
vector t.12 Every student that takes the test, takes at least the math and language tests.
There are no programs within the complete choice set J that does not require both these
tests. We use these two tests to define the student ability ai
ai = mathi + languagei,
Denote student characteristics that are observable to the researcher, i.e., the vector of test
scores, family income and gender by the vector x ≡ [t, y, g, ] , and its distribution by Fx (·).
Utility
Each option j is characterized by a geographic location lj , a common quality index δj , a
tuition level pj , and an admission threshold t̄j . We take as given the financial aid program
offered by the government, and assume that qualifying students use all available financial
resources. Let g(pj , yi) denotes the out-of-pocket cost of choosing option j,m for a student
with income yi.
The utility of attending category (j,m) depends on the quality of the program δj , a
student’s x, peer quality (Aj), distance to the school (dij) , out-of-pocket cost, and an
idiosyncratic taste shock distributed according to a type-1 extreme value distribution εij .
13
In particular, Aj is the average ability of enrollees in (j) .
11Without increasing the test fee, taking both the science and the social science exams will only enlarge
a student’s opportunity set. A student who does not take the science exam will not be considered by
programs that require science scores, but her admissions to programs that do not require science scores
will not be affected even if she scores poorly in science. However, some students only take either the
science or the social science exam, we view this as indication of their general academic interests. We treat
students’ preferences and abilities as pre-determined.
12Letting tij = n/a if a student does not take the subject test required by category m, Mt is given by
Mt = {m ∈ {1, ...,M} : tijm 6= n/a}.
13Peer quality may affect market returns via different channels, such as human capital production,
statistical discrimination, social networks, etc. Our data does not allow us to distinguish among various
channels. For ease of illustration, we describe peer quality in the framework of human capital production.
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In summary, indirect utility for student i attending campus/category j:
uij = δj + µij + αijgij + λdij + εij (2.1)
where µij is the idiosyncratic evaluation, dij is the spacial differentiation which includes
two variables, the distance between the student and the campus municipalities, and an
indicator for whether the campus j is located in a different administrative region to the
student.
µij = µ
0xi + µ
1rij + µ
2aij + µ
3wi · ωmath+sciencej
where
xi = {Genderi,Family educationi, Incomei/Family Sizei}
rij(selectivity ratio)= τijm/τ
max
aij(ability distance)= |ai − Āj |
wi = {Genderi, tmathi }
The price sensitivity parameter αij is allowed to vary by type of institution and student’s
family income and ability:
αij = ziαprivate or αij = ziαtraditional
where zi = [ai, yi].
The average quality of each college/category option is measured by the fixed-effect pa-
rameter δjt, common across consumers, and a function of the average peer quality in the
program, and an unobserved (to the econometrician) measure ξjt:
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δjt = γAjt + ξ̄j + ξjt, (2.2)
2.5.2. Admission Process
The choice of a college major depends in part of the admission process. The Chilean
admission process is very transparent, and we use the admission thresholds and weights
used by each campus to determine the set of available options for each student. Under
the Chilean system, option j is in a student’s choice set if only if tij ≥ t̄j , the institution-
category-specific admissions cutoff.
The admission threshold of major j is determined by the score of the marginal admitted
student:
t̄j =
S∑
l=1
ωjls̃il, (2.3)
where l = 1, . . . , S indexes the required tests (i.e. language, math, high-school GPA,
etc), s̃il is the result of the marginal student in campus/major j to test l, and ωjl is the
weight put on test-score l by option j. Note that schools and categories can use different
weighting scheme to determine the admission threshold, including weights of zero on tests
that are not required for certain majors. Information about each program weights is easily
available to students, and we assume that students know perfectly their admission score
associated with each program.
We make two important assumptions to simplify the model. First we assume that students
have rational expectations over the admission thresholds for each option. Therefore, the
admission thresholds determine the choice-set of each student, and there is no uncertainty
about the probability of getting admitted to a particular program. Let Ji denotes the set
of available options to student i.
Second, since we are aggregating over 400 individual programs into 21 major categories,
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we are assuming that students get admitted based on the smallest admission threshold
within a category, and automatically enroll into the best available program within that
category conditional on accepting an offer.
For instance health category at Universidad de Chile contains 7 programs with thresholds
ranging from 635 to 686. Under our admission assumption a student with a test score of
640 would get admitted in this major category, but enroll in the lowest-qualify program;
as measured by the admission score of 635. In contrast, a student with a test score of 700,
would enroll into the best program, associated with the score 686.
To differentiate between programs within each major category, we assign to each student
the highest available threshold. This corresponds to a student-specific measure of program
quality. It is denoted by a function τj(ti), where ti is the vector of test results of student
i.
Students also have an outside option of not attending any program in these 33 institutions
(either choose a program in an institution outside the centralized admission process or not
attending any program), denoted by 0. This option is available to all students, and has a
value normalized to zero.
Conditional on choosing to attend college, and the vector of peer quality in every program,
students face the following discrete-choice problem:
U(x, ε|t̄j , A) = max
{
max
j∈J (ti)
{uj(x, ε,Aj)}, ε0
}
.
The probability of choosing option j is therefore given by the following multinomial logit
model:
σj(δ, t̄|xi) =
exp (δj + µij + αijgij + λdij)
1 +
∑
k∈J (ti) exp (δk + µik + αijgik + λdik)
(2.4)
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To calculate the market-share and enrollment of each campus/major, we integrate over
the empirical distribution of student attributes:
σj(δ, t̄) =
∑
l=1,...,L
∫
σj(δ|xi)dF (ti, yi|l)φ(l) (2.5)
where F (ti, yi|l) is the conditional distribution of student test-score and family income
in municipality l, and φ(l) is the density of applicants in location l. The population of
applicants is defined as the set of students taking the required qualifying exams to enter
college, and includes about 40% of students who chose either to work or attend a technical
college.
Similarly, the average test-score of students enrolled in program j is implicitly defined as:
t̄j =
∑
l=1,...,L
∫
ti
σj(δ, t̄|xi)
σj(δ, t̄)
dF (ti, yi|l)φ(l) (2.6)
where ti is the average test-score of student i, and δj is function of t̄j through the effect
of peers on school quality in equation 2.2.
2.5.3. Market Clearing Conditions
We assume that the capacity and tuition of each program are fixed in the short-run, and
that schools adjust the admission thresholds in order to fill every available seat. If κjm
denotes the capacity of option j (expressed as a fraction of the applicant population), the
equilibrium allocation is implicitly defined by the following condition:
Q0j = σ
−1
j (κ, t̄)− ρȳj , ∀j (2.7)
where Q0j = xjβ
0 + ξ0j is the true quality index of college of j, t̄j defined in equation 2.6,
and σ−1j is the inverse-demand function. From Berry et al. (1995), there exists a unique
inverse demand that rationalizes the observed capacities, conditional on the admission
thresholds. However, due to the presence of the peer effects, existence and uniqueness
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of a sorting equilibrium is not guaranteed. This will have consequences on our ability to
solve for equilibrium allocations under alternative policy environments, but, as we discuss
below, will not prevent us to obtain consistent estimates of college quality.
2.6. Estimation and Identification Strategy
Our objective is to construct a measure of college quality that accounts for students en-
dogenous sorting and college admission policies. To do so, we follow a reveal-preference
approach, in which we estimate students’ preferences, conditional on a perceived quality
index that is consistent both with schools admission policies and students equilibrium sort-
ing decisions. In order words, we estimate a vector of perceived quality δj that is consistent
our assumption that the market satisfies the sorting equilibrium described above.
We impose the equilibrium conditions on the data in two stages. First, we estimate
by maximum likelihood the preference of students for convenience and price sensitivity
parameters, without decomposing the perceived quality of colleges into a pre-determined
and peer effect components. Then in a second stage, we estimate the quality of colleges by
imposing additional assumptions on the distribution of the unobserved quality of programs.
We describe both stages in the next two sections.
2.6.1. Student Preferences
The parameter vector can be divided in two parts: θ1 = {α, λ, γ} determines the choice-
probability of each student, and θ2 = {β, ρ}. In the first stage of our estimation strategy,
we estimate θ1 only, by treating the net quality index δj as a fixed-effect. This leads to a
constrained maximum-likelihood estimator similar to the one used in Goolsbee and Petrin
(2004) and Bayer et al. (2007).
Our sample corresponds to the population of high-school students taking the admission
tests in 2012. Let ci denotes the choice of campus/program made by student i. The
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maximum likelihood estimator can be written as follows:
max
θ1
∑
i
log σci(δ, t|ti, yi, li) (2.8)
s.t. δj = σ
−1
j (κ, t) (2.9)
2.6.2. Quality Decomposition
The presence of the quality of peers enrolled in each program creates a standard simultane-
ity problem, since we assume that students sort across schools after observing the quality
of each option, and while holding rational expectations about the quality of programs.
This simultaneity problem is akin to the endogenous of prices in differentiated product
settings.
To get around this simultaneity problem, we will combine standard panel-data techniques
with an instrumental variable approach. In particular, assuming that preference parame-
ters (θ1) remained stable over time, we can recover an estimate of the combined quality
of programs for every options available between 2001 and 2012:
δ̂js = σ
−1
js (κs, ts) (2.10)
where κs, ts are the observed vector of enrollment capacity and admission thresholds for
year s ∈ {2001, . . . , 2012}. Notice also that the the inverse-demand system has a year
subscript to capture the fact that the set and characteristics program available have been
changing over time, as well as the generosity of the government loan and grant program.
While we observe all of these changes, we do not observe micro-data on students enrollment
choices for years prior to 2012. This prevents us from estimating time-varying preference
parameters.
Treating the quality index as data, we obtain the following panel-data linear regression
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model:
δ̂jt = ρt̄jt + µj + ξjt, (2.11)
where µj is a major/campus fixed-effect.
In order to identify the effect of peer characteristics on college quality, we construct an
instrument for t̄jt. Since the characteristics of students enrolled naturally depends on the
characteristics of alternative college options, we will construct instruments based on the
time-varying characteristics of programs available at campuses that are close-substitutes
to option j. Measures of “close-substitutes” can be obtained using spatial variation.
The main threat to the validity of this class of instruments is that the physical character-
istics of competing colleges can be correlated with the unobserved college quality. This
can be the case for instance if colleges invest in technologies that we fail to observe and
are able to react to investments made by other colleges. Additionally, ξjt can proxy for
time-varying omitted attributes that are spatially correlated.
The second threat can be addressed in part by incorporating time-varying region fixed-
effects. The first threat on the other hand cannot be easily tested, and we must rely on
a timing assumption. In particular, we assume that competing colleges react to ξjs with
a lag, due for instance to the presence of sunk adjustment costs. This an often invoked
assumption in the production function literature (e.g. Ackerberg et al. (2006)).
2.7. Estimation Results
2.7.1. Preference parameters
Table 21 shows estimates for the taste parameters. The negative coefficient on the absolute
difference between own ability and average peer ability suggests that students dislike being
far from the average (either better or worse by a large difference). The coefficient on the
interaction between science weight (ωmath+sciencej ) and gender, helps to fit the fact that
females sort into social science majors that is not explained by their math test score.
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Additionally, students with high math score, tend to sort into programs with high science
weight. The negative coefficient in distance and different region show a taste for geographic
proximity, showing that students are willing to pay between 0.8 ands 1.2 million pesos
(approximately 2000 US dollars) to attend a program in their region. The intercept on
the price coefficient is significantly higher for public than private institutions, that could
be explained by the fact that private institutions offer scholarships that are not included
in the data.
There estimates can be used to calculate substitution patterns between different types of
programs when there is an increase in average quality (δjm) of a given program. Table
22 shows these patterns. Programs are arranged in four groups by average peer ability,
and diversion ratios are calculated between each program and rival programs, including
the outside option. When a program in the lower quartile of peer ability increases its
average quality, 55% of the new students come from the outside option and 32% from
programs in the lowest two quartiles. The percentage of students coming from the outside
option decreases as the average peer quality goes up. When a program in the top quartile
improves its quality, 61% of the new students come from other programs in that same
group, and only 20% from the outside option.
2.7.2. Quality decomposition
Table 23 shows the first stage using three sets of instruments for average peer ability and
university-program fixed effects. For instruments we use measures of changes in competi-
tion in the region, either share of traditional programs, or share of highly ranked programs
in the same category, or number of new programs. As expected, most of these variables
are negatively correlated with average peer ability since the entry of new competitors or
an increase in the share of competitors in the region should decrease the peer ability of
a program in that region. The validity of these instruments is discussed in the previous
section.
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Table 24 shows the decomposition of college quality. The different IV specifications tend
to increase the coefficient on average peer ability compared to the OLS estimation. This
suggests that the error term is negatively correlated with the average peer quality. This
could be explained by low quality programs in private institutions offering scholarships
that we do not observe in the data to students that have high test scores.
Additionally, in all specifications, there seem to be an upward trend starting around 2011.
This could be associated with an increase in investments that may influence perceptions
of quality.
2.8. Conclusion
This paper studies the effects of increasing competition and differentiation on accessibility
to higher education and quality of university programs. The Chilean higher education
system suffered radical modifications in the early 1980s that resulted in a highly privatized
and competitive system. Access to higher education increased significantly, with about
half of the students graduating from high-school enrolling in some type of higher education
by 2012.
We do not study the first round of reforms that led to the existence of private universities,
but a second round of reforms in 2006 and 2011 that modified the access and generosity
of government grants and loans. These changes led to a significant expansion and diversi-
fication of university programs, with institutions trying to meet the demand of a society
with increased means to finance higher education.
We find that most of the growth in enrollment comes from elite institutions that expand
the size of existing programs and private universities that almost doubled their enrollment
and at the same time doubled the number of programs offered. Also, we find significant
entry and exit of programs in private universities compared to public institutions.
We estimate a sorting model where we find considerable taste for geographically close
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programs, and females having preferences for social sciences careers, as opposed to pro-
grams stronger in math and sciences, even after controlling for math test scores. Using
these estimates, we calculate substitution patterns to see where are students coming from
when a program increase its quality. We find significant substitution between middle tier
programs, whereas top tier universities tend to substitute mainly from other programs in
that same range. For middle tier programs about 40% of the increase in share associated
with an increase in quality come from students choosing the outside option, and about
60% from students in other programs.
We decompose the quality term in investment and peers, using the entry of competitors
as an instrument for peer quality. There seems to be an improvement in average quality
of programs over this period, especially after 2011.
Further work is necessary to be able to use these results to simulate a counter-factual
distribution of education quality under an alternative configuration in which the Chilean
government would have limit the expansion of private colleges. This will allow us to shed
light on the tradeoff between the quality and accessibility of higher education.
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Table 14: Increase in Number of Programs
Year Nb. Majors Campus Majors per Institution
/Inst. Private Traditional
2005 1634 2.5 59.3 66.9
2006 1678 2.6 61.9 67.9
2007 1643 2.5 60.7 66.6
2008 1737 3.5 65.3 74.2
2009 1796 3.5 71.7 73.2
2010 1850 3.4 82.4 75.5
2011 1946 4.0 95.2 78.1
2012 1910 2.5 101.4 71.8
2013 2051 2.6 105.8 76.8
2014 2099 2.7 108.7 77.1
2015 2148 2.7 109.1 79.3
Note: This table presents the number of undergraduate
programs and number of campuses in traditional and pri-
vate universities. Source: DEMRE
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Table 15: Average Student Characteristics across Types of Institutions
Elite Public Private CRUCH Private Non-CRUCH Outside Option
Avg. Family Income 8.99 5.25 5.79 9.98 4.58
Avg. Mother’s Educ. 13.47 12.03 12.09 13.49 10.99
Avg. PSU Score 646.53 572.65 576.29 596.36 467.43
Prop. of Students w/ Scholarship 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.22 0.16
Prop. of Students w/ Loan 0.25 0.38 0.39 0.36 0.23
Prop. Of Students from Private School 0.31 0.09 0.12 0.38 0.12
Note: This table present average characteristics of students attending each type of higher education institution. Family income is annual
income measured in millions of pesos. Mother’s education is measured in years of education. The outside option includes any high-school
graduate that applied to some program in these universities but either was not admitted or chose not to enroll in a program to which he was
admitted.
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Table 16: Growth by Type of Institution
Panel A: Total Number of Programs
Year Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
2005 435 727 191 281
2006 447 735 207 296
2007 426 739 193 292
2008 427 791 211 312
2009 447 784 231 343
2010 452 785 240 373
2011 453 838 236 419
2012 462 748 255 445
2013 489 808 283 471
2014 479 830 299 491
2015 488 873 290 497
1.20% 1.99% 4.43% 5.94%
Panel B: Total Enrollment
Year Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
2005 21,152 30,386 7,903 15,888
2006 22,618 28,164 8,054 19,133
2007 24,221 25,221 8,301 19,024
2008 23,931 25,072 8,413 21,576
2009 24,134 24,774 9,370 22,903
2010 25,983 25,527 10,189 24,117
2011 26,584 25,362 10,346 25,125
2012 28,364 24,941 10,597 27,028
2013 28,345 28,011 11,082 28,488
2014 28,282 28,136 11,664 29,851
2015 30,174 30,349 11,860 28,829
3.67% 0.18% 4.19% 6.32%
Note: Panel A presents the number of programs in each
year by type of institution. Institutions are classified in
four groups: Type 1 corresponds to six elite institutions,
private or public that commonly appear in international
rankings. Type 2 corresponds to CRUCH public uni-
versities that are not in group 1. Type 3 corresponds
to CRUCH private universities that are not in group
1. Type 4 corresponds to private non-CRUCH universi-
ties that participate in the centralized admission process.
The last row shows the average yearly growth. Panel B
presents the total enrollment by type of institutions and
the last row shows the average yearly growth.
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Table 17: Growth Decomposition
Total Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Period 1
Incumbent -1,132 2,559 (56.5%) -6,953 (-109.9%) -423 (-22.1%) 3,685 (47.6% )
Entry 14,860 2,257 (49.8%) 5,185 (81.9% ) 2,649 (138.6% ) 4,769 (61.6% )
Exit -5,878 -286 (-6.3%) -4,561 (-72.1%) -315 (-16.5%) -716 (-9.3%)
Total Growth 10.4% 4,530 -6,329 1,911 7,738
Period 2
Incumbent -36 2,282 (54.5%) -787 (-16.3%) -1,290 (-77.2%) -241 (-5.1%)
Entry 18,069 2,210 (52.7% ) 7,079 (146.8% ) 3,336 (199.6%) 5,444 (115.5%)
Exit -2,637 -301(-7.2%) -1,470 (-30.5%) -375 (-22.4%) -491(-10.4%)
Total Growth 17.9% 4,191 4,822 1,671 4,712
Note: This table shows a decomposition of enrollment growth between incumbent institutions, new entrants, and
institutions that exited during that period for each type of institution. First period corresponds to 2005-2009,
and the second period corresponds to 2010-2015. Institutions are classified in four groups: Type 1 corresponds
to six elite institutions, private or public that commonly appear in international rankings. Type 2 corresponds
to CRUCH public universities that are not in group 1. Type 3 corresponds to CRUCH private universities that
are not in group 1. Type 4 corresponds to private non-CRUCH universities that participate in the centralized
admission process.
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Table 18: Decomposition of Growth in Program Size
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Period 1
Incumbents 8.12 -9.88 1.75 18.80
Entry -0.53 -7.45 -5.16 -2.73
Exit 0.26 2.50 0.31 1.61
Period 2
Incumbents 6.15 -0.93 -6.33 12.04
Entry -2.11 -2.32 -3.37 -14.91
Exit 0.93 0.10 1.24 2.11
Note: This table shows a decomposition of program size growth between
incumbent institutions, new entrants, and institutions that exited dur-
ing that period for each type of institution. Each entry corresponds to
the growth measured as the average number of students. For the en-
trants the size of the new programs is compared to the average size in
the previous period and for exit programs, the size is compared to the
average size that period. First period corresponds to 2005-2009, and
the second period corresponds to 2010-2015. Institutions are classified
in four groups: Type 1 corresponds to six elite institutions, private or
public that commonly appear in international rankings. Type 2 corre-
sponds to CRUCH public universities that are not in group 1. Type
3 corresponds to CRUCH private universities that are not in group 1.
Type 4 corresponds to private non-CRUCH universities that participate
in the centralized admission process.
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Table 19: Changes in Test Score Thresholds
Year Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
2005 562.8 497.9 488.7 332.7
2006 567.6 498.6 495.3 339.9
2007 578.9 504.3 498.6 328.0
2008 575.2 500.2 502.6 328.6
2009 587.3 504.5 506.0 342.5
2010 582.2 506.6 504.1 563.6
2011 577.1 510.5 503.4 565.7
2012 572.0 496.6 497.7 518.6
2013 558.5 498.2 493.9 519.0
2014 548.4 491.2 492.2 514.7
2015 548.2 492.7 492.0 516.3
Note: This table shows the average math and language
score of the last student admitted in each type of institu-
tion each year. Institutions are classified in four groups:
Type 1 corresponds to six elite institutions, private or
public that commonly appear in international rankings.
Type 2 corresponds to CRUCH public universities that
are not in group 1. Type 3 corresponds to CRUCH pri-
vate universities that are not in group 1. Type 4 corre-
sponds to private non-CRUCH universities that partici-
pate in the centralized admission process.
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Table 20: Growth Decomposition
Aggregate ∆ Admission Thresholds (2015-2005)
Aggregate ∆ Min PSU -5.58
Olley-Pakes Decomposition
Unweighted average -2.38
Covariance -3.20
Within Decomposition Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Aggregate Min PSU -14.62 -5.21 3.25 4.28
Unweighted Avg -13.34 0.99 7.24 9.86
Within Covariance -1.27 -6.20 -3.99 -5.58
Note: This table shows the Olley-Pakes decomposition and the within decomposition
in each of the four groups, showing how much of the change in thresholds comes from
larger programs relative to the average.
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Table 21: Preference Parameters
Coefficients Std. Error
Intercept Gender 0.581∗ 0.122
Education of parents 0.009 0.009
Income/Family size −0.118∗ 0.028
Relative admission score −0.459 0.359
|Ability-Avg Peer Ability| −2.471∗ 0.080
Science weight × Math score 11.519∗ 1.245
Science weight × Gender −1.376∗ 0.291
Distance −0.315∗ 0.048
Different region −2.396∗ 0.085
Price - Public Intercept −2.899∗ 0.222
Test score 0.540∗ 0.037
Income/Family size 0.016 0.009
Price - Private Intercept −1.969∗ 0.212
Test score 0.408∗ 0.036
Income/Family size 0.028∗ 0.007
LLF/N −1.65
Note: This table presents the estimated parameters and standard errors for the sorting
model. Gender is an indicator variable equal to one for females and zero for males.
Education of parents is measured in years of education, income in millions of pesos per
year. Admission score is measured in thousands of points (same as ability, which is
just the average of math and language test scores). Distance is measured in hundreds
of miles, and different region is an indicator variable equal to one if the program is
located in a region different to the student’s home region. Prices are measured as out
of pocket tuition after considering government grants and loans, in millions of pesos
per year.
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Table 22: Business Substitution when Quality Increases
Own Peer Outside Rival Peer Ability
Ability Option (āmin, ā.25) (ā.25, ā.5) (ā.5, ā.75) (ā.75, ā1)
(āmin, ā.25) 0.55 0.14 0.18 0.10 0.03
(ā.25, ā.5) 0.48 0.11 0.20 0.16 0.06
(ā.5, ā.75) 0.36 0.06 0.16 0.24 0.18
(ā.75, ā1) 0.20 0.01 0.05 0.13 0.61
Note: Programs are classified in four groups according to the average student ability.
Each cell is the average fraction of new students going to row schools that come
from the column schools, when a row school marginally increases its quality using the
results from the estimation.
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Table 23: College Quality Decomposition - First Stage
Average Peer Ability
Share of programs in region/category -4.998*** -3.290** -4.404***
(1.181) (1.113) (1.166)
New programs in category 1.876*** -2.273**
(0.537) (0.852)
Share of top ten programs in region -5.463** -5.450**
(1.678) (1.671)
Share of old institutions in the region -17.914*
(7.691)
Ranking × New Programs in Region 0.285***
(0.046)
F-test 11.60 8.70 17.72
Note: This table presents the first stage estimation using different sets of instruments
for average peer ability in the program.
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Table 24: College Quality Decomposition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES OLS IV 1 IV 2 IV 3
Avg. Peer 0.009*** 0.035** 0.021 0.020*
(0.001) (0.013) (0.012) (0.009)
2006 -0.183*** -0.101 -0.147** -0.146**
(0.044) (0.058) (0.056) (0.048)
2007 -0.031 -0.166 -0.096 -0.089
(0.044) (0.088) (0.077) (0.064)
2008 -0.181*** -0.311*** -0.235** -0.233***
(0.044) (0.084) (0.075) (0.063)
2009 0.196*** -0.043 0.087 0.093
(0.044) (0.136) (0.123) (0.098)
2010 0.336*** -0.023 0.177 0.190
(0.044) (0.195) (0.174) (0.135)
2011 0.467*** 0.156 0.331* 0.343**
(0.044) (0.176) (0.152) (0.123)
2012 0.300*** 0.166 0.240** 0.249**
(0.043) (0.105) (0.091) (0.080)
2013 0.547*** 0.421*** 0.490*** 0.479***
(0.043) (0.105) (0.095) (0.086)
2014 0.816*** 0.745*** 0.782*** 0.769***
(0.043) (0.096) (0.087) (0.083)
Program FE X X X
Weak IV 9.623 5.668 10.045
J-test (p-value) 0.668 0.106 0.065
Note: This table presents the quality decomposition by OLS and using the three
different IV specifications shown in Table 23
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Figure 10: Growth in College Enrollment in Chile 2005-2014
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Note: This figure shows the total share of high-school graduates attending some type of higher education
program each year from 2005 to 2014.
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Figure 11: Growth in Enrollment by Type of Institution
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Note:This figure shows the share of students in higher education attending a traditional institution and
the share attending a private institution, each year from 2005 to 2014.
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